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In this essay, I would like to explore the relation between
two stories-the sorry tale of David Cash and the biblical
story of the Good Samaritan. The story of the Good Samari-
tan is already well known to you. It's about a lawyer.
And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted [Je-
sus], saying, Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?
He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest
thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour
as thyself. And he said unto him, Thou hast answered
right: this do, and thou shalt live.
But [the lawyer], willing to justify himself, said unto Je-
sus, And who is my neighbour? And Jesus answering
said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho,
and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment,
and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.
And by chance there came down a certain priest that way:
and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side.
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and
looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a cer-
tain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and
when he saw him, he had compassion on him, [a]nd went
to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine,
and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn,
and took care of him. And on the morrow when he de-
parted, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host,
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and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou
spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.
Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour
unto him that fell among the thieves? And he said, He
that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go,
and do thou likewise.1
The tale of David Cash is less uplifting than this-so much
less uplifting that Mr. Cash has sometimes been referred to
in the newspapers as a "Bad Samaritan"' (though this, as we
shall see, is a slander on Samaritans).
Cash, a Los Angeles area resident, saw a friend, Jeremy
Strohmeyer, 19, of Long Beach, attack a 7-year-old girl in
the ladies restroom of a Nevada casino near Las Vegas,
but only walked away without trying to stop the attack or
report it, police say. The victim, Sherrice Iverson, was
then sexually molested and strangled to death, authorities
say. Strohmeyer was charged with murder, kidnapping
and sexual assault in the May 1997 crime and is on trial.
But Cash was not charged with anything. Police deter-
mined Cash was not an active participant in the rape and
murder, just a witness, although a horrendously passive
one, to the beginning of the crime.
It was Cash's refusal to show any remorse for the child
or any regrets for his inaction in interviews with the Los
Angeles Times and on a radio talk show in Los Angeles in
July that really made stuff hit the fan. "I'm not going to
get upset over someone else's life," he told the Times. "Ijust worry about myself first." His sympathies were with
jailed friend Strohmeyer, he said, and he was "not going to
lose sleep over somebody else's problems"-a reference to
Sherrice's death. On the contrary, he said, his notoriety
had helped him get dates....
Clark County, Nev., District Attorney Stewart Bell said,
Cash's inaction "may be a crime in the eyes of God, but not
in the eyes of the Nevada Legislature."2
The two stories are connected by the fact that laws of the
sort that would have been necessary to punish David Cash for
walking out of the restroom without trying to save Sherrice
1. Luke 10:27-37 (King James).
2. See Bad Samaritan: Law Does Not Require People to Help, but Decency
Does, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1998, at A46; Bad Samaritan: Youth Stands by
While Pal Kills 7-year-old, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 29, 1998, at B10.
3. Clarence Page, Some Others Take the Prize for Selfishness, HOUS.
CHRON., Sept. 1, 1998, at A16.
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Iverson are known as "Good Samaritan" laws.4 Needless to
say, there was pressure to enact a Good Samaritan law in
Nevada after the events involving David Cash and Sherrice
Iverson;5 indeed, it was even proposed that there should be
federal legislation urging states to do this.6
It is perhaps unfortunate that the legislative proposal
was tailored very specifically to the event that elicited it: the
proposal was not for a general duty to rescue, but a duty to
rescue children who were being sexually assaulted.7 This de-
4. For recent examples, see Sungeeta Jain, How Many People Does it Take
to Save a Drowning Baby?: A Good Samaritan Statute in Washington State, 74
WASH. L. REV. 1181 (1999); John T. Pardun, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global
Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 591 (1998). Pardun cites the fol-
lowing definition from Black's Law Dictionary: "Good Samaritan statute. A law
that requires a person to come to the aid of another who is exposed to grave
physical harm, if there is no danger of risk of injury to the rescuer." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). Sometimes, however, laws of this kind are
called "Bad Samaritan" laws (named, presumably, for their targets rather than
their role-models). See, e.g., H.M. Malm, Liberalism, Bad Samaritan Laws, and
Legal Paternalism, 106 ETHICS 4 passim (1995).
5. See Martin Kasindorf, Bystander Also Guilty, Slain Girl's Advocates
Say, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1998, at 4A.
To give prosecutors new options in future cases, syndicated columnist
Earl Ofari Hutchinson and Najee Ali, director of Project Islamic Hope
here, are lobbying Nevada legislators to pass "Sherrice's Law" and have
suggested a federal version of the same bill. These "good Samaritan"
measures would criminalize an adult's failure to report a sexual assault
on a child.
Id. For a critique, see Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Il-
legal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability,
25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385 (1998).
6. See Nick Lampson, Need Better Tools to Protect Our Missing Children,
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1999, at A41. Lampson, a Democrat who represents
Texas' Ninth U.S. Congressional District, wrote in that article:
While Congress cannot legislate morality, we have the unique opportu-
nity of directing attention toward a specific issue. After 7-year-old
Sherrice Iverson was molested and killed in a Nevada casino while an-
other man watched and did nothing to stop the attack, I wanted to
raise the public's awareness of its responsibility of reporting crimes to
authorities. I introduced the Sherrice Iverson Act, which called for
states to enact "Good Samaritan" laws and create criminal penalties for
witnesses who fail to report sexual crimes against children to authori-
ties. Although the bill did not pass the House last session, I have since
gained considerable bipartisan support for the bill, which I will rein-
troduce during this Congress.
Id. There is a discussion of this legislative proposal in Jessica R. Givelber, Im-
posing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to By-
stander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169 (1999).
7. But at least the proposal did not restrict the duty to incidents occurring
in handicapped stalls in casino restrooms.
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gree of specificity reminds me of Jeremy Bentham's comment
on the blind, impulsive character of legislation in eighteenth-
century England: "The country squire who has had his tur-
nips stolen, goes to work and gets a bloody law against steal-
ing turnips. It exceeds the utmost stretch of his comprehen-
sion to conceive that the next year the same catastrophe may
happen to his potatoes."8  Nevertheless, the story of David
Cash and the legislative proposals responsive to it have
helped to bring more general issues into focus. Legal scholars
have debated the desirability of Good Samaritan laws for
some time now,9 and there is continuing controversy about
how badly it reflects on our type of legal system that such re-
quirements seem incompatible with the spirit of the common
law.1" The fact that many jurisdictions outside the common
law world have and enforce such requirements-apparently
as a matter of course-only heightens the issue for us.11
My intention in this essay is to consider anew the rele-
vance of the original Good Samaritan story. There are a cou-
ple of aspects I want to consider. First, in Part II of the es-
say, I shall consider the significance of the fact that the
parable of the Good Samaritan is told to a lawyer and pre-
sented as a story about legal obligation. Given that fact, is
there any reason for us to regard it as relevant only to moral
duty, as opposed to state-enforced law? I shall argue that the
answer is "No" and that the response of the Good Samaritan
is presented as exactly the sort of response that law is capa-
ble of securing in a circumstance of immediate danger or
8. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 264
(1986).
9. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.
L. REV. 798 (1976); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47
VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994); Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Sa-
maritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General
Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252 (1983); Wallace M. Rudolph, The
Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). There is an excellent
collection of papers in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (James M. Ratcliffe
ed., 1966).
10. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 76-98 (1991).
11. See Pardun, supra note 4; see also Peter M. Agulnick & Heidi V. Rivkin,
Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue: A Brief Survey of French and American
Law, 8 ToURO INT'L L. REV. 93 (1998); F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Sa-
maritans: A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning failure
to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630 (1966).
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need. Secondly, in Part III of the essay, I shall consider the
importance for us of an aspect of the parable that is least
studied by modern lawyers and moral philosophers, though it
is perfectly familiar to theologians and biblical historians.
There was an important ethnic and religious divide between
Jews and Samaritans in first-century Palestine. That it was
a Samaritan, rather than either of the temple officials from
Jerusalem, who proved neighbor to the man who fell among
thieves is-I shall argue-a challenge to all who would pur-
sue a communitarian account of the obligation of mutual as-
sistance. The point of the parable is to reprove not only the
inauthentic self-interest of a David Cash, but also the convic-
tion of many self-confident theorists that the category "hu-
man" is too abstract to serve as a focus for what we owe to one
another. They think that duties owed to humanity must be
"thickened" with a generous roux of convention and shared
understanding. But the parable does not suppose that.
Rather, it supposes that people can see right through the lay-
ers of convention, commonality, and difference, and respond
directly-as the Good Samaritan responded-to the immedi-
ate presence of the person underlying the layers of commu-
nity.
I know it may be thought inappropriate to place too much
weight on the parable, given that we have an obligation to
present legal and political proposals in a way that is accessi-
ble also to citizens who do not regard the Christian Gospels as
authoritative. 2 However, I believe the Good Samaritan story
is helpful in bringing some important issues into focus; 3 and
12. John Rawls has argued that a liberal society must respect an ethos of
"public reason," in which at least constitutional essentials are debated in terms
that are accessible to all citizens and that do not presuppose allegiance to any
particular comprehensive philosophy or religious tradition. See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1996); see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991);
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 146, 152 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THE
LAW OF PEOPLES]. I have expressed my own doubts about this requirement in
Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions to Political Deliberation, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817 (1993).
13. In his latest book, John Rawls suggests that the introduction into public
discourse of something like the Good Samaritan story may be appropriate "pro-
vided that in due course proper political reasons-anid not reasons given solely
by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that are sufficient to support what-
ever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support." RAWLS, THE
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 12, at 152. Notice that Rawls mentions the use
10572000]
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it is important, too, to deal with some misapprehensions that
may arise out of too hasty a reading of the parable.
How likely is it, though, that we will be able to find any-
thing new in the Good Samaritan story?14 The parable has
been interpreted and reinterpreted, and one might be excused
for thinking its significance for our debate is pretty much ex-
hausted. 5 But like many biblical passages, these three hun-
that someone might make of the story of the Good Samaritan in order to illus-
trate this point. See id. at 155.
14. I made an attempt myself some years ago in Jeremy Waldron, Welfare
and the Images of Charity, 36 PHIL. Q. 463, 469 (1986), reprinted in JEREMY
WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-91, at 225, 232 (1993).
There I suggested we might think of the Good Samaritan in some cases as
helping by omission: failing to enforce his own property rights when another
tries to take what he desperately needs. See also the use of the Good Samaritan
parable to illustrate the difference between telling a story and stating a rule, as
rival modes of moralizing, in JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW (1990).
15. The record for the largest number of political uses of the Good Samari-
tan story is held, I believe, by Margaret Thatcher (Baroness Thatcher, former
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom). Her most famous (from 1980) was re-
ported in David Sexton, Laughing In The Face Of Adversity, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1987, at xi: "No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he only had good
intentions. He had money as well,' Margaret Thatcher observed." This remark
(now collected in several modern Dictionaries of Quotations) enraged her oppo-
nents. See Frances Welch, "Elastic" Christian Can't Stretch to Lady T., SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 10, 1995, at 2 ("When I bring up Lady Thatcher's es-
pousal of religion and her controversial 'Good Samaritan' talk to the Scottish
clergy, Dalyell stiffens: 'I loathe that woman . . . . The Church of Scotland
clergy and elders treated her with the contempt she deserved.'). At the same
time, Thatcher's remark encouraged one of her ministers to add that the Good
Samaritan evidently did not believe in the welfare state. See Damian Thomp-
son, Runcie Irritated by Political Lectures, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 26,
1991, at 5:
Sir Rhodes Boyson, Tory MP and former Minister, has attacked the
Churches for criticizing Government policy rather than preaching the
virtues of personal morality. In a speech at Durham University, he
said the Good Samaritan "did not send for a welfare officer or stand on
a street corner with a petition for additional Government expenditure
when he met the wounded man."
Id. More recently the British conservative party has sought to distance itself
from Thatcher's interpretation. See Jill Sherman, Tories are Samaritan Party,
says Hague, TIMES (London), Feb. 16, 1999, at 8:
Mr Hague said it was Margaret Thatcher who pointed out that if the
Good Samaritan had not been a wealthy man he would not have been
able to help the poor victim. "She was absolutely right," Mr Hague
said. "My determination is to ensure that when the Samaritan is
wealthy he doesn't cross by on the other side of the street. My Conser-
vative Party is going to reach out."
Id. Other interpretations by Baroness Thatcher are reported in the following:
(1) Philip Johnston, Thatcher Joins Battle on New-look Labour, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 14, 1989, at 1: "She also displayed her irritation with
2000] GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM 1059
dred words (there are footnotes in this essay that are longer!)
have a potential out of all proportion to their size. And as we
shall see, they hold one or two surprises.
II.
To begin: the presence of a lawyer (nomikos)6 in the Good
Samaritan story ought to be of interest to us. It is common-
place to remark that the parable is about morality, not law,
and that the most it establishes is a basis for a moral re-
proach against the likes of David Cash, not a reason for en-
acting and enforcing a statutory duty. Thus, Chief Justice
Carpenter observed in the 1898 case of Buch v. Armory
Manufacturing,
With purely moral obligations the law does not deal. For
example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the other
side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the contin-
ued suffering of the man who fell among thieves, which
they might, and morally ought to have, prevented or re-
lieved.'
the recent remarks of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Runcie, who said Brit-
ain had become a Pharisee society of self-interest and hypocrisy. Mrs. Thatcher
retorted: 'For every Pharisee our system produces, you will find at least three
Good Samaritans."' Id.
(2) David Wastell, Thatcher accuses West, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London),
Aug. 6, 1995, at 2:
Lady Thatcher has renewed her assault on the Western powers for
failing to act more effectively over Bosnia, accusing the UN and, by im-
plication, Britain of "acquiescing in genocide." In a lecture to the Aspen
Institute in Colorado-where, five years ago almost to the day, she met
President Bush to plan the West's response to Saddam Hussein's inva-
sion of Kuwait-Lady Thatcher said the policy that had worked then
had been abandoned for Bosnia. The most significant lesson of history,
she said, was "never appease an aggressor." But, in Bosnia, she said,
"the Serb aggressor is being appeased, while we do not even allow the
Bosnians to be supplied with the arms with which to defend their
homes, women and children." She said "abiding principles," not just
temporary interests, were at stake in Bosnia. "Feeding and evacuating
the victims rather than giving them the means to resist aggression
make us accomplices, rather than Good Samaritans."
Id.
(3) Finally, Matthew D'ancona reported that Baroness Thatcher also argued
"that it was all very well to love your neighbour as yourself, as long as you re-
membered that you often hated yourself." Matthew D'ancona, The Tory Faith of
Tony Blair, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 7, 1996, at 28.
16. In some translations "an expert in the law," in others "a man who
taught Mosaic law."
17. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898).
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Now actually, as an observation about the Mosaic tradi-
tion that was at issue between Jesus and His interlocutor,
this is mistaken. What Jesus' questioner produced was a
summary of the law, with "Love thy neighbor as thyself' un-
derstood by all concerned as an all-purpose commandment
covering every single legal duty that is owed to other human
persons. It is supposed to epitomize not only the requirement
of helping behavior, but also the duty not to kill, the duty not
to steal, and the general duty of justice. "Love thy neighbor"
is emphatically not a moralistic add-on to a legal code. In-
stead, it sums up the spirit of the legal code. There is, more-
over, no reason to suppose that the helping behavior required
is any different from the negative duties set out in more ex-
tensive statements of the law. So Chief Justice Carpenter is
wrong."5 The priest and the Levite did have a legal obligation
to aid their fallen neighbor; Mosaic law imposed quite com-
prehensive duties to render aid to the needy.19
Later, I shall say something about the reading of the
parable that has the priest and the Levite torn between the
duty they owed to the man who fell among thieves and their
legal obligation, as temple officials, to maintain ritual pu-
rity."° If they thought the man was dead, the requirements of
their temple ministry might preclude touching his body. Or,
if they thought there was a chance he was dead-remember
his assailants "wounded him, and departed, leaving him half
dead"21-they would not want to take the risk of pollution.
18. See supra text accompanying note 17.
19. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 15:4-11 (King James); see also Anne Cucchiara
Besser & Kalman J. Kaplan, The Good Samaritan: Jewish and American Legal
Perspectives, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 193 (1993/1994).
Jewish law, by contrast, emphasizes the obligation of the stranger to
help one in need. Liabilities may be incurred if the bystander fails to
act. . . . Unlike American common law concepts, which imposed no
duty to rescue a stranger, Jewish law obligates the bystander to inter-
vene when someone's life is endangered. The Torah commands "Thou
shalt not stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor." This means, for ex-
ample, that an individual may not neglect to save the life of an Israelite
if the would be rescuer is a good swimmer and has the ability to save
the person drowning with no harm to himself.
Id. at 196, 211 (quoting Leviticus 19:16).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
21. Luke 10:30 (King James). Our phrase "half-dead" translates a Greek
term that would refer to someone on the point of death. As one commentator
puts it: "He is between life and death, beaten so badly that one cannot be cer-
tain whether he will survive." BRAD H. YOUNG, THE PARABLES: JEWISH
1060 [Vol. 40
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Even so, the issue was still one of law: only, on this reading, it
involved a dispute, in the interpretation of the Torah, as to
whether the legal demands of ritual purity prevailed over the
legal requirements either to help a wounded man or to bury a
dead one.22
Of course, the fact that this was a legal issue in first-
century Israel doesn't settle the matter for us, for our concern
is to elaborate (and consider changing) a body of secular law,
rather than the norms of a religious tradition. Some readers
may object that I am in fact cheating, by saying that the
priest and the Levite were bound by religious law to help the
man who fell among thieves. This, they may say, is an
equivocation on "law." For of course the term "law" is used
loosely to cover all sorts of norms-from the laws of God to
the laws of baseball. One might as well say that David Cash
was bound by the moral law to intervene to save Sherrice
Iverson. That might be true, and if we said it, everyone
would know what we meant. But it would not be the same
thing as saying that Cash ought to have had legal liability for
his omission in the sense of real law-the law enforced by the
civil authorities in the state of Nevada, in the United States
of America. From this perspective, then, the presence of "a
certain lawyer" in the Good Samaritan story is just a distrac-
tion. Luke's nomikos was an expert in religious "law," not law
in the sense we are talking about. One might as well have
begun the story by saying, a certain theologian or a certain
moral philosopher stood up to question Jesus.
That is an understandable objection. But it is not appro-
priate for two reasons. First, in Israel in the era of the Sec-
ond Temple, there was no such distinction between religious
law and real law.23 Religious law was fully part of the law en-
TRADITION AND CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION 111 (1998).
22. See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 109-15.
23. The closest approximation might be a distinction between the rules en-
forced by the Roman occupiers and the rules that the Romans permitted the
Jews to enforce among themselves. See, for example, passages such as this:
Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of judgment: and it
was early; and they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest
they should be defiled; but that they might eat the passover. Pilate
then went out unto them, and said, What accusation bring ye against
this man? They answered and said unto him, If he were not a malefac-
tor, we would not have delivered him up unto thee. Then said Pilate
unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according to your law. The
Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to
106120001
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forced in Jerusalem (just as-though the case is different in
other respects-shari'a is fully part of the law enforced in
Iran, Afghanistan, or Saudi Arabia). Secondly, no one is de-
nying that David Cash was innocent of any offense in the
Sherrice Iverson case so far as the laws then enforced by the
civil authorities in Nevada were concerned. The question is
whether those laws ought to be changed. The story of the
Good Samaritan is used in the discussion of that question. It
is, of course, not dispositive of the question; but it may be
judged irrelevant only if the duties appealed to in that story
(or the considerations on which they are based) are shown to
be wholly inappropriate as a basis for law reform in Nevada
or elsewhere in the modern world -if, for example, they are
shown to be oriented towards wholly non-legal ideas. But we
must not simply dismiss the parable in the peremptory way
that the objection envisages.
In general, it is probably not a good idea to begin our dis-
cussion of the Good Samaritan story (and its relevance to the
sorry tale of David Cash) by trying simply to impose on it our
distinction between "law" and "morality" as an appropriate
template of analysis. 4 Instead, if we think that the distinc-
tion is important, we should bring it thoughtfully into rela-
tion with the Good Samaritan story by asking ourselves care-
fully what exactly we think is at stake in the distinction, and
what (if anything) is being made of that stake in the story.
For example, we may think that there is an important dis-
tinction between actions for which a certain motivation is im-
portant, and actions that are important or necessary no mat-
ter how they are motivated. And we may think that law (in
death....
John 18:28-31 (King James).
24. Cf. Besser & Kaplan, supra note 19.
The difference between Jewish and American systems in imposition of
liability for failure to give aid can be explained, in part, by the recogni-
tion in Jewish law that law and morality are closely linked and have a
common origin in Judaic sources. This inseparability finds expression
from time to time when Jewish law, functioning as a legal system, itself
impels recourse to a moral imperative for which there is no court sanc-
tion. This notion depends on the fundamental belief that human pun-
ishment and divine retribution function as equal components of a sin-
gle scheme. The Pentateuch makes no textual distinction on which to
base enforcement and non-enforcement or between those which are




the sense of "the law enforced in the state of Nevada") should
be concerned only with the latter. If that is what we think,
then we should ask whether any distinction of that kind is
important in the Good Samaritan story, and-if it is-what is
made of it. By doing that, we take the opportunity to reflect
on our distinction between law and morality-an analytical
construct that seems to do so much work in our thinking
about David Cash-by holding the distinction itself open to
illumination or revision on the basis of our discussion of the
parable.
I can think of at least five things in regard to our
law/morality distinction that we might want to consider in
this way. The first, which I have just mentioned, is the issue
of moral motivation and its relation to the imposition of legal
sanctions. The second has to do with the importance, in mod-
ern law, of actually specifying the behavior that is required or
forbidden: moral values are sometimes thought not to be ca-
pable of pinning things down in the way that law requires.
The third has to do with the existence of moral (and also re-
ligious) disagreement and diversity in a pluralist society. The
fourth is our sense of the distinction between requiring omis-
sions and requiring actions, and the rough correspondence be-
tween that distinction and the distinction between law and
unenforceable morality. The fifth concerns the special con-
cern for individual liberty which our law/morality distinction
is supposed to uphold. Thus, an opponent of Good Samaritan
laws may say we should not legislate to require a future
David Cash to come to the rescue of a future Sherrice Iverson
(1) because we want rescuers to be motivated by altruism, not
fear of criminal sanctions, (2) because such legislation, moti-
vated as it is by a mere moral "ought," will likely be too vague
to admit of fair and consistent administration, (3) because
there is no consensus in society on the moral/religious values
on which a duty to rescue is based, (4) because the required
intervention would be an action, not an omission, and (5) be-
cause such legislation would not do justice to the future David
Cash's right to liberty or the value of his freedom. If the Good
Samaritan story is to cast any light on our modern thinking
about legal duties to rescue it ought to help us think through
considerations like these.
2000] 1063
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A. Moral Motivation and Sanctions
Some writers object that Good Samaritan laws will sub-
vert altruism by replacing other-regarding motives with a
self-regarding fear of legal penalties.25 Their objection may be
filled out by pointing to the difference between a legal tradi-
tion (like Mosaic law), which unites what we think of as
moral obligation with a more general scheme of sanctions,
and a legal tradition (like ours), which draws sharp distinc-
tions in the area.
But, even filled out in this way, the objection fails.26 One
thing to note is that, in fact, modern law does not distinguish
sharply between motivations in this way. Criminal courts
commonly use the language of moral condemnation, to distin-
guish, for example, cases where the death penalty is thought
appropriate in American law, or to govern whatever discre-
tion is left to judges in sentencing. It is implicitly and impor-
tantly assumed, in the body of the criminal law, that people's
main motivations for refraining from rape, murder, robbery,
etc. is that they know it is wrong; and the imposition of sanc-
tions, like death or imprisonment, is intended to cover the
cases-alarming cases, not ordinary cases, in the eyes of the
law-in which moral requirements per se have not been effec-
tive. And this remains true in cases where the law requires
action, rather than merely forbidding it. The law requires the
25. See, e.g., Lester H. Hunt, An Argument Against a Legal Duty to Rescue,
26 J. SOC. PHIL. 16, 18-20 (1995); see also MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 747-48 (1997).
26. For an excellent refutation, see A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some
Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983).
A Good Samaritan law would require us, not to become Good Samari-
tans, but only to behave as if we were.... What the law would require
is a certain performance. If it also induces a certain attitude, then so
much the better. But the requirement would be the minimum re-
quirement of performance, that we do not pass by on the other side;
and, if some of us need as our motive the fear that the law may catch
us if we try to pass by, then the existence of the law would provide it.
But it would do nothing to prevent a genuine Good Samaritan from
acting as one; the demand that we act according to the law is not the
demand that we act out of respect for it. If the criticism had the force
claimed for it, and the introduction of a Good Samaritan law would
make it impossible for us to be Good Samaritans, then by analogy it
must be the case now that none of us can display honesty in our han-
dling of each others' goods-owing to the unfortunate existence of the
larceny laws.
Id. at 1292-93; see also Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1152, 1169-76 (1999).
1064 [Vol. 40
GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM
ordinary citizen to remain at the scene of an accident in
which his car has been involved, and there is no question but
that it expects him to do so on the basis of a desire to render
aid, summon help, and assist the authorities. It is nonsense
to suppose that the law discounts such motivations or seeks
to supplant them with a fear of penalties. The penalties are
there to ensure that, in the unlikely event the moral motiva-
tion fails, there will be something else with which to deter
flight or the evasion of responsibility. And the same is evi-
dently true of those many countries in which there is a gen-
eral duty to rescue.
Opponents say, nevertheless, that the imposition of legal
sanctions will mean that neither rescuers nor beneficiaries
will ever be sure that the rescue was motivated by altruism.
This is a preposterous objection, for two reasons. First, as
Immanuel Kant noted at the beginning of Section II of his
Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, no one can ever be
sure of their motivations anyway, even in cases where the law
is not involved.27 And secondly, as one commentator has
pointed out, it hardly seems right that those whose rescue
might be motivated by a Good Samaritan statute should have
to linger in danger so that the rest of us fine people can se-
cure for ourselves a clearer sense of our own altruistic vir-
tue. 8
If we turn now to the detail of the Good Samaritan story,
we find almost nothing to indicate that what mattered was
the Good Samaritan's attitude or his altruistic mentality (or
anything else that civil law might complicate or undermine).
Admittedly, unlike some Bible stories,29 the account is not en-
27. See IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1996).
It is indeed sometimes the case that with the keenest self-examination
we find nothing besides the moral ground of duty that could have been
powerful enough to move us to this or that good action and to so great a
sacrifice; but from this it cannot be inferred with certainty that no cov-
ert impulse of self-love, under the mere pretense of that idea [i.e. moral
duty] was not actually the real determining cause of the will; for we
like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler mo-
tive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-
examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives....
Id. at 61. This passage is conventionally cited as 4:407, referring to the Prus-
sian Academy Edition of Kant's works.
28. See Woozley, supra note 26.
29. See ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN
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tirely objective: we are told that when the Samaritan "came
where [the wounded man] was: and when he saw him, he had
compassion on him."3 Still, it is what the Samaritan did that
matters, not the integrity of his compassion." Indeed, there
is an attractive matter-of-factness in the story. The Good
Samaritan does not pause to congratulate himself on his vir-
tue. As Peter Winch puts it, nothing intervenes between the
Samaritan's taking in the situation and his practical compas-
sionate response. The Samaritan simply does what compas-
sion dictates.
[A] certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he
was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him,[a]nd went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in
oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought
him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow
when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them
to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will
repay thee.33
When, at the end of the story, the lawyer is asked which of
the characters in the parable proved himself neighbor to the
man who fell among thieves, he has no hesitation in resolving
the matter by reference to action-"He that shewed mercy on
WESTERN LITERATURE 5-9 (1953).
30. Luke 10:33 (King James) (emphasis added).
31. Similarly, Kant argues that even "the passages from scripture in which
we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy," KANT, supra note 27,
at 55 (4:399), must be interpreted as being mainly about actions rather than af-
fections:
For, love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from
duty-even though no inclination impels us to it and, indeed, natural
and unconquerable aversion opposes it-is practical and not pathologi-
cal love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of feeling, in
principles of action and not in melting sympathy....
Id. at 55. Note that "pathological" here means "dependent upon sensibility," not
"sick." But see Oswald Hanfling, Loving My Neighbour, Loving Myself, 68 PHIL.
145, 149-51 (1993) (doubting about whether Kant's interpretation will do).32. See Peter Winch, Who is My Neighbour?, in TRYING TO MAKE SENSE
154, 156 (1987). I am grateful to Jeffrey Murphy for this reference.
33. Luke 10:33-35 (King James); see also YOUNG, supra note 21, at 107.Young provides an intriguing account of the structural properties of the way the
narrative describes the Samaritan's helping. "ITIhe Samaritan reverses the ac-
tions of the robbers in dramatic movements that retrace their steps." Id. The
robbers left him; the Samaritan "went to him." The robbers beat him and
wounded him; the Samaritan "bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine."
The robbers took the man's money; whereas the Samaritan paid in advance for
his care at the inn. See id.
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him"3"-as opposed to the bare psychological fact of compas-
sion.
Finally, we should remember that-to the to the extent
that there is a distinction between morality and sanctions-
the Good Samaritan story is presented in Luke's gospel as a
story about sanctions. "[W]hat shall I do," said the lawyer, "to
inherit eternal life?" 5 Do what the Samaritan did, says Je-
sus: "Go, and do thou likewise." 6 That is the way to get the
reward that the lawyer is inquiring after. There is no sugges-
tion in response to this or any other similar inquiry that
asking about the prospects for eternal life is an inappropriate
way of approaching duty. All of Jesus' teaching associates al-
truism with sanctions, and not just affirmative sanctions ei-
ther.37 The notion that there is something unchristian or
amoral about compelling or extrinsically motivating helping
34. Luke 10:37 (King James).
35. Id. 10:25.
36. Id. 10:37.
37. Thus consider the great parable of the sheep and the goats in Matthew
25:31-46:
When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels
with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: And before him
shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from an-
other, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats: And he shall set
the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left.
Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye
blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the
foundation of the world: For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I
was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:
Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in
prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer him,
saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? or thirsty,
and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in?
or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and
came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily
I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of
these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.
Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me,
ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels:
For I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye
gave me no drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and
ye clothed me not: sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not. Then
shall they also answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hun-
gred, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did
not minister unto thee? Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I
say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye
did it not to me. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment:
but the righteous into life eternal.
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behavior is quite ill-founded."
B. Specification
Morality can inspire action, but it is often not clear ex-
actly what it demands of us. In the most generous under-
standing, it requires us to orient our practical capacities to
certain goods and (aversively) to certain evils, with regard to
others as well as ourselves. But figuring out how to do justice
to various moral values in one's choices is a difficult and deli-
cate task in the complicated circumstances of human life."9
For consider the Samaritan: he seems to do everything that is
necessary for the relief of the man who fell among thieves."
But we can imagine him doing less or more, and still counting
as "good."4' He might have bound up the man's wounds, but
left him by the side of the road until someone else came by
with a wagon; or he might have taken him to the inn, but left
it up to the innkeeper to decide what provision to make for
his needs." Or, in addition to what he did do in the story, he
might have come back later and visited the man to see how
his wounds were healing, how his family was getting by with-
out the money he was robbed of, and so on. The elasticity of
the duty generated by the commandment "Love thy neighbor"
may not be a worry in a moral or religious code, but it does
seem to be a worry in a system of state-enforced law. Enacted
38. However, I do not mean to deny that the way moral sanctions are inte-
grated with conceptions of duty in Mosaic law is somewhat different from the
way the two are integrated in modern American law (not to mention modern
ethical thought). For a discussion of some differences, see Besser & Kaplan, su-
pra note 19, at 193. Nor do I mean to gloss too quickly over the idea of extrinsic
motivations: it is probably quite wrong, theologically, to regard Jesus' promise
of eternal life in His presence as a mere hedonistic incentive, unrelated to the
content of His commandment to us to love one another.
39. There is an excellent discussion in the chapter on "Practical Reason-
ableness" in JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-27 (1980).
40. With perhaps one exception: the Samaritan does nothing to help the
authorities track down the bandits who assaulted he has rescued. But see infra
text accompanying notes 100-05.
41. Compare the distinctions drawn between Minimally Decent Samaritans,
Good Samaritans, and Splendid Samaritans in JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON,
RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 15-18 (1986).
42. Because Samaritans were despised by Jews, the Good Samaritan was
actually taking a risk in doing more than was strictly necessary. As Brad
Young points out, "if a despised Samaritan had been found with a man who had
been brutally murdered by brigands, it is not unlikely he would have been
charged with the crime." YOUNG, supra note 21, at 117.
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in that form in the criminal code of Nevada, it would likely be
struck down as void for vagueness."
There are two versions of this difficulty, one mild, one se-
vere. The mild version is that anyone fashioning a Good Sa-
maritan statute for modern law will be faced with the chal-
lenging task of specification, so that the legislation makes it
reasonably clear to the citizen-especially, I guess, the non-
morally-motivated citizen-what is required and in what cir-
cumstances.44 And it may be difficult, as it often is in legisla-
tion, to establish and defend a particular bright line between
conduct which the law will require on pain of penalty and
conduct whose omission it will at most simply deplore." But
43. But see Wisconsin v. La Plante 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(discussing the failure of a vagueness challenge to an actual Good Samaritan
statute).
44. The specification need not be fanatically precise to avoid a vagueness
challenge.
The challenged statute . "need not define with absolute clarity and
precision what is and what is not unlawful conduct." A statute is not
void for vagueness simply because "there may exist particular in-
stances of conduct the legal or illegal nature of which may not be ascer-
tainable with ease." The ambiguity must be such that "one bent on
obedience may not discern when the region of proscribed conduct is
neared, or such that the trier of fact in ascertaining guilt or innocence
is relegated to creating and applying its own standards of culpability
rather than applying standards prescribed in the statute or rule."
Id. at 450 (quoting State v. Pittman, 496 N.W.2d 74, 93 (Wis. 1993)).
45. The classic discussion is in Thomas Macaulay, Report Upon the Indian
Penal Code, in 7 WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 493-94 (H. Trevelyan ed., 1866),
cited by Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
369, 391 n.57 (1997). Commenting on the absence of what we would call "Good
Samaritan" requirements in the code, Lord Macaulay remarked:
We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put our rule
may appear to be too lenient. But we do not think that it can be made
more severe, without disturbing the whole order of society. It is true
that the man who, having abundance of wealth, suffers a fellow crea-
ture to die of hunger at his feet, is a bad man,-a worse man, probably,
than many of those for whom we have provided very severe punish-
ment. But we are unable to see where, if we make such a man legally
punishable, we can draw the line. If the rich man who refuses to save
the beggar's life at the cost of a little copper is a murderer, is the poor
man just one degree above beggary also to be a murderer if he omits to
invite the beggar to partake his hard earned rice? Again: If the rich
man is a murderer for refusing to save the beggar's life at the cost of a
little copper, is he also to be a murderer if he refuses to save the beg-
gar's life at the cost of a thousand rupees?
Id.
And Macaulay's discussion culminated with this oft-quoted example:
It will hardly be maintained that a surgeon ought to be treated as a
murderer for refusing to go from Calcutta to Meerut to perform an op-
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this need not be a problem for the citizen unless he is faced
with the additional prospect of guilt or liability established by
analogy upon this vague provision as a premise.
It may help here to consider a particular dimension of
vagueness. It is tempting to think that we should take our
stand in favor of a principle of easy rescue-i.e., a principle
requiring people to come to the aid of others only when it is
easy for them to do so." The moral philosopher T.M. Scan-
lon's formulation is typical:
One principle stating our duties in such cases would hold
that if you are presented with a situation in which you can
prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate
someone's dire plight, by making only a slight (or even
47moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.
Now, as a legal principle, this might face problems, on ac-
count of the indeterminacy of phrases like "something very
bad" and "slight (or even moderate) sacrifice." For exactly
similar reasons, however, Scanlon's formulation is probably
best not regarded as a moral principle either. Instead, it con-
veys an idea that might be associated with a moral princi-
ple-namely, the idea that the greater the sacrifice that
would be borne by the rescuer, the less unreasonable a failure
to rescue might be. Once that idea is understood, it can be
embodied in the law in either of two familiar ways: either by
artificially stipulating a bright legal line at some point along
what morality regards as a continuum (as we do with speed
limits, ages of consent, etc.), or by making it clear (through
the use of terms like "reasonable") that the relevant legal
provision is to be administered by prosecutors and juries as a
standard, not a rule.
Neither of these strategies is objectionable in itself. But
eration, although it should be absolutely certain that this surgeon was
the only person in India who could perform it, and that if it were not
performed, the person who required it would die.
Samuel Freeman, Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 9, at 258 ("There are different types of res-
cues, some more difficult than others. The controversy over whether to recog-
nize a general legal duty to rescue is primarily a controversy about easy res-
cues."); see also Weinrib, supra note 9, at 250. The legislatures of almost all the
states in the U.S. with Good Samaritan laws have imposed duties of "easy res-
cue." See Givelber, supra note 6, at 3191.
47. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 224 (1998).
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there remains a worrying possibility that, by pinning things
down in a way that satisfies the requirements of legality, a
legislature may actually distort and damage the moral char-
acter of the duty to rescue. That possibility may be under-
stood as follows.
Suppose we view coming to a person's aid-the sort of
thing the Good Samaritan did-as part of a general moral re-
quirement of beneficence. When we think about beneficence,
we may regard it as (in the technical philosophical sense) an
imperfect duty: a duty that commands concern for the welfare
of others, but which is understood to leave a certain amount
of latitude for free choice in determining what to do about it.48
For example: I meet many beggars as I walk around New
York, and I am sure it would be wrong not to give money to
any of them; but I am (almost) equally sure it would distort
my moral situation to require me to give money to each, or to
say that I am required to use specified criteria to figure out
who to give money to and who to refuse.
One way of capturing that distortion is as follows: it mis-
conceives my moral relation to the beggars to say that any of
them has a moral right to money from me; it is right for me to
give, and wrong not to give (at least to some of them), but
that choice is morally mine and not the subject to any rightful
demand on their part. By contrast, a perfect duty-i.e., a
duty determining a particular action that must be performed
(or, as the case may be, omitted) on every occasion-can usu-
ally be correlated with a right.49 I owe a perfect duty of re-
payment to each of my creditors, and I do not have a morally
protected choice to pay some but not all when the time for re-
payment comes: each of them has a right to be repaid by me.
Similarly, I have a perfect duty not to kill you: and you have a
48. See KANT, supra note 27, at 521. For technical discussions of Kant's
idea, see Thomas E. Hill, Kant on Perfect Duty and Supererogation, 62 KANT-
STUDIEN 55 (1971); Daniel Statman, Who Needs Imperfect Duties?, 33 AM. PHIL.
Q. 211 (1996); Michael Stocker, Acts, Perfect Duties and Imperfect Duties, 20
REV. METAPHYSICS 507 (1967).
49. For the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties in regard to
rights, see 3 JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in DISSERTATIONS AND
DISCUSSIONS: POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND HISTORICAL 300, 369 (1882).
For earlier sources (in Pufendorf and Grotius), see Heyman, supra note 9, at
673, 699-701. Note that although most perfect duties can be correlated with
rights, not all can. Those that are not correlative to rights are things like per-
fect duties to oneself-for example, the duty to refrain from suicide-or perfect
duties owed to God-for example, the duty to refrain from blasphemy.
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right not to be killed by me. Any time the possibility of my
killing you is in question, the duty and the right kick in, and I
am required to refrain from killing you on all-not merely
most-occasions when the question arises.
The worry then is that, by enacting Good Samaritan
statutes, the legislature would distort our moral life by turn-
ing imperfect moral duties into perfect legal duties, or duties
that do not correlate with moral rights into duties whose vio-
lation may justly be complained of at law, as a matter of
right, by those whom we fail to assist.
50
What sort of worry is this? What sort of distortion is in-
volved when an imperfect moral duty is supplanted by a per-
fect legal one? Is the issue one of liberty (or something like
liberty, such as protected discretion or the importance of
choice)? Immanuel Kant didn't think so: he was quite impa-
tient with the idea that we should place any value on the
element of freedom or self-regard in a person's proper moral
attention to his imperfect (or, as Kant called them, "wide")
duties:
[A] wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make ex-
ceptions to the maxim of actions but only as permission to
limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one's
neighbor in general by love of one's parents), by which in
fact the field for the practice of virtue is widened .... '
This might strike us as overly rigoristic. Maybe we do
value the element of freedom that is involved in a person
choosing which sorts of "good works" to get involved with,
which charities to give to, etc. But even if we do, the most
that can be demanded for this freedom of choice is that it
have some such sphere for its operation; and that sphere of
possible good works is likely to continue, largely undimin-
ished, whether we enact Good Samaritan laws or not.
Moreover, the passage from imperfect moral duties to
perfect legal duties need not involve any distortion at all. It
50. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Two Methods for Evaluating Duty to Res-
cue Proposals, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 181 (1986).
Failures to act, including failures to rescue, allegedly exhibit a differ-
ence in kind from actions that justify, indeed demand, different legal
treatment. That difference is variously described: ... as that between
duties of a specific obligor to a specific obligee ("perfect" duties) and
those that take no specific obligee ("imperfect" duties).
Id.
51. KANT, supra note 27, at 521.
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may simply be a transformation reflective of the changes in
circumstances that make law and legal duty possible in a
sphere previously governed only by morality. There may be
areas where one of the proper functions of law is actually to
perfect what, from the moral point of view, are imperfect du-
ties.52 An obvious example is welfare provisions for the poor.
In the absence of any collective provision coordinated by the
state, each of us would have an imperfect duty to do some-
thing to alleviate the direst poverty. That duty would be
somewhat more demanding than our present duty to give to
beggars in the streets (for whom some sort of organized assis-
tance is supposedly available). But it might still be an imper-
fect duty even in a welfare-less state: since there are millions
of us, and since each case of dire poverty is contemplated by
many people, each of whom is capable of ameliorating it, it
would not be reasonable to require each of us to give aid on
every occasion where giving aid was a possibility. Such a sce-
nario of individual giving would of course be haphazard: the
burdens of duty-performance would likely be spread un-
evenly, and many cases of dire need might not be relieved at
all. Morally lax people might free-ride on everyone else's re-
sponse to the problem; and good people might be deterred
from charity by a fear of being taken advantage of in this
way. Thus, the institution of a coordinated scheme in which
collective efforts were made to divide the burdens and bene-
fits of poverty-relief fairly and evenly would have consider-
able advantages, from a moral point of view. But it could only
work if, in effect, previously imperfect duties were recon-
ceived as perfect duties (e.g., a duty to contribute one's fair
share to a central fund, out of which each and all of the needy
would have something like a right to a fair share of assis-
tance). Those who cite the perfect/imperfect duty distinction
to resist Good Samaritan statutes have seldomly thought
about this possibility. But in fact it is implicit as the moral
basis of existing doctrine: emergency personnel (firefighters,
etc.) have a special and perfect obligation to come to the aid of
those in their jurisdiction who need their help, and we as tax-
52. There is an excellent discussion of this in Allen Buchanan, Perfecting
Imperfect Duties: Collective Action to Create Moral Obligations, 6 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 27, 32-41 (1996); see also Robert E. Goodin, The State as a Moral Agent, in
THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 123 (Alan Hamlin &
Philip Pettit eds., 1989).
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payers have a perfect obligation to pay our fair share of the
cost of providing such services. In this way, even if the back-
ground duty to rescue is an imperfect duty, we have discov-
ered an efficient way of perfecting it.
I wonder, however, whether it even really makes sense to
think of the moral duty to rescue-in either the David Cash
case or in the Good Samaritan case-as an imperfect duty
(even a legally perfectible one). The mere fact that it is re-
lated to and can be derived from an imperfect duty (viz., the
general duty of beneficence) does not mean that the duty to
rescue is itself imperfect. Think, again, of David Cash
watching from a bathroom stall as his friend struggles with
Sherrice Iverson. Cash is there, on the spot, and there are
things he can do-he can rush in, he can try to haul his friend
off her, he can start shouting as loud as he can for help-
things that are quite likely to save the girl from indecent
assault, injury, and death. Does anyone really want to say
that Cash has a moral obligation to intervene only in some
such situations that he finds himself in, but that he need not
intervene in all? Does anyone really want to imply that there
could be a number of situations-say three-just like this in
David Cash's adolescence, such that he would have a moral
obligation to intervene to save little girls' lives from the
depredations of his friends in only one or two of them? Surely
the moral truth of the matter is that he had a perfect duty to
intervene in this case-there, as he was, on the spot, with
some influence over his friend and no other help immediately
available. And if this was his moral situation, it is not at all
clear why a legislature would be distorting anything by
making it his legal duty as well.
Peter Winch has made a similar point about the story of
the Good Samaritan. The Samaritan evidently does not see
his helping the man who fell among thieves as a matter of
discretion:
The Samaritan responds to what he sees as a necessity
generated by the presence of the injured man. What I
mean by introducing this word ["necessity"] can be
brought out by considering what someone in the Samari-
tan's position, and responding as he did, might say if
urged by a companion to hurry on so as not to miss his




Evidently the "can't" here is not physical necessity: the priest
and the Levite seem to experience no difficulty in passing by
on the other side after they see the injured man's plight.54
But it is something like moral necessity, akin-and this is the
important point-to the necessity (the moral stop, if you will)
associated with perfect duties, like the duty not to kill or the
duty to repay one's debts. Someone who doesn't really grasp
the moral category of murder may think it a matter of discre-
tion whether to take a life or not; but he is wrong. And simi-
larly, the story indicates, the priest and the Levite are
wrong:55 they fail to see that the injured man's plight presents
assistance as compulsory-a matter of moral necessity-not a
matter of choice or discretion.
The key here to all this-in the rescue cases-is some-
thing like proximity, the persons in question being there, on
the spot: "a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where
he was . ,,." The others-the priest and the Levite-when
they were "at the place, came and looked on him, and passed
by on the other side." Like David Cash, they had to go out of
their way to break the relation of sheer proximity that had
generated a perfect duty on them, also, to help. 7 There is
something determinate about these situations that no theo-
retical talk of imperfect duty can really shake. In a case like
this, where I am on the spot, and where help, if it is to come
at all, can only come from me, the demands of morality are
compelling. To that extent, it is quite wrong to say that a
Good Samaritan law would distort the moral structure here
by making this duty-like certain other moral duties-com-
pulsory.
C. Disagreement
In modern society, the law/morality distinction some-
times marks the difference between moral disputes on which
53. Winch, supra note 32, at 157.
54. See id.
55. This is true, of course, barring the issues about ritual purity raised in
supra text accompanying note 20, and infra text accompanying notes 68-71. In
that regard, note that conflicts of duty, or limits or qualifications on duty, have
nothing to do with the perfect/imperfect distinction.
56. Luke 10:33 (King James) (emphasis added).
57. Note also the discussion of the active and intentional nature of the omis-
sion in these cases. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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the law has taken sides, and moral disputes which have been
left to rage unresolved. Sometimes law withdraws from a
field, once it becomes clear that the citizens do not agree
about whether something is a moral duty: this is true of
states where, for example, anti-sodomy laws have been re-
pealed. And it is true, too, of law's withdrawal in modern lib-
eral societies from the field of religious observance. Perhaps,
then, by the same token, law should refuse to enter a field
where moral controversy is raging. If the citizens disagree
about the morality of rescue, then the law should be wary of
taking a stand on the issue.
But whatever we think of this as a general position in
political theory, it is mostly inapplicable here. For-as far as
one can tell-there is almost no disagreement in our society
about the existence of a moral requirement to rescue. The
disagreement is only over the question of whether this ac-
knowledged moral duty should be enforced by a legal duty."
And of course it would be question-begging to say that the
mere existence of that disagreement counts in favor of one
side rather than the other.
Thus, people who argue for Good Samaritan laws and
those who oppose them mostly agree about the moral wrong-
ness of failures to rescue. Indeed, opponents of Good Samari-
tan laws are often the most vocal in their moral condemna-
tions." Very few of those who opposed the prosecution of
David Cash believed he behaved morally or well in failing to
intervene to save Sherrice Iverson." And despite his bragga-
58. Even Eugene Volokh's latest intervention, Eugene Volokh, Duties to
Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88 GEO. L.J. 105 (1999), is at
most an economic argument against legal enforcement. Professor Volokh is not
like Mr. Gradgrind in Book II, Chapter 12, of CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES
215 (The Oxford Illustrated Dickens, 1955), who "sat writing in the room with
the deadly statistical clock, proving something no doubt-probably, in the main,
that the Good Samaritan was a Bad Economist."
59. Jeffrey Murphy, for example, says that a man he imagines sitting in a
lounge chair next to a swimming pool while a toddler drowns should be con-
demned "as a piece of moral slime properly to be shunned by all decent people."
Jeffrey Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 THE MONIST 168, cited in
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 130 (1984); see also Leonard Pitts, Jr., Sto-
ries about Two Men, Two Killers and One Conscience, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 11,
1998, at 2 ("I wonder how it lives with itself, this little scrap of putrefaction
called David Cash."). Needless to say, there is nothing in the story of the Good
Samaritan or the moral to be drawn from it that can possibly justify the use of
dehumanizing epithets like these.
60. A typical newspaper column opposing Good Samaritan legislation be-
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docio of self-interest,"' I suspect that David Cash also believes
he acted wrongly. (I shall argue later that these points are
relevant also to the issue of liberty.)62
I noted earlier that the fact that the Good Samaritan
story is told in the New Testament may be thought to be a
reason why the law should steer clear of its moral."3 After all,
Christianity is just one religion among others in a pluralistic
society, and perhaps we should not intervene legislatively on
behalf of its lessons as opposed to those of other belief-
systems. But even if that is true in general, it is hardly true
of the Good Samaritan parable in particular. The parable
does not present the duty to rescue in any controversial theo-
logical or metaphysical light: it is not presented, for example,
as a response to the immanence of Christ in the victim as it is
in Matthew's sheep and goats story." The Good Samaritan
story is a straightforward account of ordinary human re-
sponses to ordinary human need. On most accounts, the story
itself betrays nothing about moral disagreement: the priest
and Levite simply put the demands of convenience ahead of
the demands of morality. And at the end, the lawyer has no
greater hesitation in answering Jesus' question-"Which now
of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that
fell among the thieves?" 65-than he had in answering the
original question about what is written in the Torah. The
lesson of the story, I guess, is the insistent and almost self-
evident character of this ordinary moral demand. It is the
sort of thing that is often subordinated to self-interest; but it
is the sort of thing that definitely should not be. Such rig-
orism is certainly Christian; but in this context, there is no
reason whatever to say that it is exclusively so.
gins: "No one denies what college student David Cash Jr. did or did not do was
deplorable." Lynda Gorov, Proposed Samaritan Law Comes Under Fire,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1999, at A3.
61. See supra text accompanying note 3:
"I'm not going to get upset over someone else's life," [Cash] told the
Chronicle. "I just worry about myself first." His sympathies were with
jailed friend Strohmeyer, he said, and he was "not going to lose sleep
over somebody else's problems"-a reference to Sherrice's death. On
the contrary, he said, his notoriety had helped him get dates.
Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 81-94.
63. See supra discussion notes 12-14.
64. See Matthew 25:31-46 (King James); see supra note 37.
65. Luke 10:36 (King James).
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Theologians have suggested a couple of dimensions of
possible controversy. W.O.E. Oesterley suggests that those
who failed to help the man who fell among thieves might have
neglected him perhaps because they thought his fate was
probably deserved." Paul Ramsey asks us to consider
whether Jesus would have countenanced the Samaritan's
using force against the robbers if he had come on the scene
earlier. 7 Brad Young raises the possibility that there is a
particular issue about ritual purity in the parable, with the
priest and the Levite portrayed as overly concerned with rit-
ual cleanness, and unwilling to risk impurity from touching
what might well turn out to be a corpse. There was, says
Young, disagreement between Sadducees, who interpreted
such cleanliness demands as absolute, and Pharisees, who
qualified them with rules drawn from the "oral Torah," like
the duty to save life and to bury the dead. We are supposed
to understand, apparently, that the priest and the Levite
would have fallen into the former category. (Ironically, how-
ever, an observant Samaritan would have sided with the
Sadducees rather than the Pharisees on this matter, for they
too observed the written Torah unembellished by oral teach-
ings.)" But even if there is an issue of ethnic or religious dis-
agreement here, it is not the sort of thing which makes it im-
possible to legislate. At worst, it could be handled by a
religious accommodation, of the sort that enables members of
religious groups to avoid otherwise applicable requirements
and prohibitions.7'
D. Acts and Omissions
In our discussions of the duty to rescue, an enormous
amount turns on the distinction between the active infliction
66. See W.O.E. OESTERLEY, THE GOSPEL PARABLES IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR
JEWISH BACKGROUND 163-64 (1936).
67. See 41 PAUL RAMSEY, Christian Vocation and Resistance, in THE
ESSENTIAL PAUL RAMSEY: A COLLECTION 47-48 (W. Werpehowski & Stephen D.
Cracco eds., 1994).
68. See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 109-10.
69. See id. at 112-15.
70. See id. at 115-17.
71. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (discussing varia-
tions from required military dress code). But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494




of harm and the failure to provide assistance. Bad as David
Cash is, for example, we think there is a huge difference be-
tween his wrongdoing and that of his friend Jeremy Stroh-
meyer, who actually molested and killed the little girl. Even
those of us who believe in a duty to rescue think that the pri-
mary duty we owe to others, in regard to the harm that might
befall them, is to not actively inflict it.
From this perspective, there is something unsettling
about the story of the Good Samaritan. Neither Jesus nor the
lawyer shows any interest at all in this aspect of the matter.
We may think it negligence, even malpractice, on the lawyer's
side not to have raised the acts/omissions distinction (or plead
it in behalf of the priest or Levite). But the fact remains, it
does not appear to be an issue in the story. It is taken for
granted on all sides that one's duty to one's neighbor is a duty
to help as well as a duty not to harm. There is no question of
its being merely the latter. That is, there is no question of
anyone thinking that the priest and Levite are bound only by
negative duties to the man who fell among thieves, or that
they proved neighbor to him simply in virtue of their not ac-
tively making things worse.
Again, in our parsing of the commandment "Love thy
neighbor," the neighbor is seen as the beneficiary, as con-
trasted with the person to whom the command is directed.
Holding fast to this distinction is important for us, so we can
keep track of who is acting and who is omitting. But none of
this seems to matter in the story of the Good Samaritan. The
active culprits-the thieves-leave the picture very quickly,
and little is said about them. For the rest, "neighbor" is
treated as a purely symmetrical relation, applying equally to
salvor and victim. Indeed, so striking is the biblical neglect of
our distinctions that the lawyer-though anxious to justify
himself-makes no comment on the fact that Jesus turns the
issue around so that by the end of the story "neighbor" desig-
nates not the person to be helped, but the person who pro-
vides assistance.
"Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour
unto him that fell among the thieves? And he said, He that
shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go, and do
thou likewise."" That this reversal or reciprocity of neighbor
72. Luke 10:36-37 (King James).
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is deliberate is clear also from the entanglement of roles in
the parable of the sheep and goats in Matthew, where Christ,
in His glory, is presented as saying to those who have proved
good neighbors:
For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty,
and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:
Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I
was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the right-
eous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hun-
gred, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When
saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and
clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and
came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto
them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it
unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it
73unto me.
There, the role of beneficiary is entangled with that of com-
mander, and we are given a glimpse of the depth of meaning
in Christ's commandment in the intimacy of the Farewell Dis-
courses: "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love
one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one an-
other."74
There is another point, too, in the parable, about acts and
omissions. Those who fail to help the man who fell among
thieves are portrayed as going out of their way not to help, or
going out of their way to avoid the decision about whether to
help. They may have been inactive-going about their own
business, with no thought for the man who fell among
thieves-at the time the latter was actually robbed. But at
the moment they confront the choice of whether to help, their
attention is riveted upon him and their actions are more or
less completely oriented to his plight (oriented aversively, it's
true, but oriented all the same): "[Bly chance there came
down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he
passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he
was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on
the other side."75 Their not helping is an intentional doing: a
decision to cross the road, a choice to go out of their way to
73. Matthew 25:35-40 (King James).
74. John 13:34 (King James). "Farewell Discourses" refers to chapters 13 to
16 of John's Gospel.
75. Luke 10:31-32 (King James) (emphasis added).
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avoid the injured man. Modern philosophers, in their hy-
potheticals, like to present the failure to rescue as a mere ab-
sence of response to someone's plight.76 But in real life it is
seldom that. One's hard-heartedness often has to struggle
with a combination of impulse or attempt to help, and with
confusion, distress, anger, a voyeuristic desire to see what is
happening, and so on.77 Even David Cash made a half-
hearted attempt to stop his friend's assault on Sherrice Iver-
son: his offense was not one of pure inaction, but rather of
failing to do very much or a decent minimum to help the girl.
And he too, like the priest and the Levite in the biblical story,
eventually turned and walked away from the scene." And
like them, he did this deliberately.
One need not hold this as a general truth about omis-
sions. There is no logical difficulty in conceptualizing an
omission as the mere absence of action.79 But it is not always
a good idea to orient oneself to the purity of the most abstract
case. In almost all situations where rescue might plausibly
be required by law, all the agents concerned-potential help-
ers and potential victims-are likely to have their attention
focused on the victim's predicament, and they would have to
make a serious effort of will to shift from that orientation to
going about their ordinary business with no thought for the
victim's plight. It is not a question of the law making us pay
attention-distracting us, as it were, from our own legitimate
pursuits. Humans being what they are, their attention is fo-
76. For instance, take the example of a man sitting in a lounge chair next to
a swimming pool while a toddler drowns in Murphy, supra note 59, at 168.
77. See Lawrence Zelic Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 171, 173-82.
78. See Nora Zamichow, The Fractured Life of Jeremy Strohmeyer, L.A.
TIMES, July 19, 1998, at Al.
David watched. He would admit later that he had a "small degree"
of concern. He walked to the adjacent stall, boosted himself up onto the
toilet seat and tried to get Jeremy's attention. Sherrice was struggling.
As Jeremy clutched the squirming girl, he repeatedly told her, "Shut up
or I'll kill you," according to David.
"I was telling him to let go," David would later tell a grand jury,
"trying to get him to come out of the restroom. I knew at that point
that the little game that they were playing kind of crossed the line. I
was tapping on his forehead. At one point, I accidentally knocked off
his hat. He looked up at me, kind of in a stare, you know, like he didn't
care what I was saying."
Id.
79. See generally MOORE, supra note 25, at 262-73.
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cused already: the law's contribution is to add an extra layer
of motivation for action pursuant to that attention.
I don't mean this point about psychological orientation to
be conclusive in the debate. And certainly, the fact that al-
most all of the omissions that Good Samaritan laws would
punish are intentional omissions-i.e., decisions that are pre-
occupied with the situation to which they are an agonizingly
non-interventionist response-does not make them equiva-
lent to the active infliction of harm. But Good Samaritan
laws do not aim at such legislative equivalence. What is pro-
posed as a penalty for failing to prevent a harm of level H is
usually a great deal less than what is already established as a
penalty for the active infliction of H. Maybe there are some
hardline consequentialists who see this as an inconsistency,"
but the advocacy of a duty to rescue does not depend on any
such equivalence. Points about failures of equivalence be-
tween an omission to rescue and the active infliction of harm
are therefore simply irrelevant. So it is not enough for oppo-
nents of Good Samaritan legislation to simply cite the
acts/omissions distinction, unless what they are proposing is
that the law should never penalize omissions at all, no matter
how modest the penalty might be.
E. Liberty
I believe the points just made may be quite important
also for the way we think about liberty-based objections to
Good Samaritan laws.81 Even if we grant that a legally en-
forced duty of easy rescue would be a restriction on people's
choices, it is likely to be a restriction only upon a "choice" that
is already torn and conflicted between the impulse to help
and the aversion to getting involved, a choice whose cheerful
autonomy is most likely already drained or polluted by bad
conscience. As we have seen, libertarian opponents of the
duty to rescue insist-often quite stridently-that they are
very much in favor of moral sanctions for failures to rescue.
They hope that David Cash will burn in hell, that others will
avoid him, and that he will find it impossible to live with
80. See, e.g., TED HONDERICH, VIOLENCE FOR EQUALITY: INQUIRIES IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 58-100 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
151 (1973).
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himself. Assuming all this is sincere,82 the liberty they argue
for in these cases is a liberty that they themselves hope will
be more or less worthless to its possessor, as he turns away
from another's need "into the bleak wilderness of his soul."
83
Still-I suppose we have to concede-liberty remains lib-
erty even when it is liberty to do wrong, even when it is hag-
ridden by the free man's own bad conscience. 4 To deny this
would be to move from the liberal conception of negative lib-
erty-the absence of coercion-to some notion of positive lib-
erty, where a person is said to have freedom only if he is in a
position to do what he at least judges to be good or right."5
But although conceding that is often regarded as the end of
the debate, it is striking how many of those who have thought
most deeply about liberty have ended up adopting some ver-
sion of the positive or moralized view: I mean not just the
usual suspects, like Rousseau," Hegel,87 and T.H. Green,8 but
also St. Paul,8 John Locke, ° and (in some moods) even Isaiah
82. Perhaps a dodgy assumption, given the stridency of the rhetoric used by
opponents of Good Samaritan legislation, when they are trying to show every-
one how much they agree that failures to rescue are immoral.
83. I have adapted this characterization of David Cash's "freedom" from Mi-
chael Kelly, Decency Demands Some Justice, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Sept. 10, 1998, at 53A.
84. This point is usually supported with a citation from Isaiah Berlin: "Eve-
rything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or cul-
ture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience." ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts
of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 125 (1969).
85. See id. at 131-34, 148-54.
86. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65 (Maurice
Cranston trans., 1968) ("[T]o be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while
obedience to a law which one prescribes to oneself is freedom.").
87. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 192-93
(Allen W. Wood ed., 1991) ("[D]uty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of
freedom in the abstract, that is, of unfreedom: it is the attainment of essential
being, the acquisition of affirmative freedom.").
88. See T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in
LIBERTY 21, 21 (David Miller ed., 1991) ("When we speak of freedom as some-
thing to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing...
something worth doing.").
89. See Romans 7:15-20 (Revised Standard Version) ("I do not understand
my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate....
I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but
the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no
longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.").
90. See JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988) ("Freedom is not, as we are told, a Liberty for every Man to do
what he lists ... but a Liberty to dispose and order, as he lists, his Person, Ac-
tions, Possessions, and his whole Property, within the allowance of those Laws
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Berlin himself."' All of these thinkers are disposed, one way
or another, to deny that there is a genuine trade-off of liberty
in cases where the law prohibits an action that is wicked, de-
praved, or unjust. (Certainly this is the upshot of the Jewish
tradition invoked in the Good Samaritan story.)9' Those who
take this approach need not deny that there is restriction,
constraint, even coercion when penalties are imposed to get
people to do things that (they know) they ought to do. What
they usually do deny is that there is any liberty-cost, any loss
of liberty, in the sense in which liberty is a value.93 There is
an element of constraint in the laws against murder, they
may say, but that hardly implies that we face a trade-off in
the case of homicide legislation between a loss of valued lib-
erty, on the one hand, and the protection of human life
against murder, on the other. On the contrary, we usually
deny that the murderer's "freedom" to kill should have any
weight in our calculations at all; and it is hard to see why we
should say anything different about the "freedom" of David
Cash to leave his best friend killing Sherrice Iverson in a
bathroom. 4
under which he is.").
91. Even Isaiah Berlin, certainly no friend to this sort of positive conception,
is aware of its attraction. "Have not men had the experience of liberating them-
selves from spiritual slavery, or slavery to nature, and do they not in the course
of it become aware, on the one hand, of a self which dominates, and, on the
other, of something in them that is brought to heel?" BERLIN, supra note 84, at
132.
92. Cf Besser & Kaplan, supra note 19, at 193.
The newcomer to Jewish law finds a major surprise in the law's insis-
tence that freedom is expressed specifically in the performance of the
613 commandments (tiryag mitzvot). This can be seen in Rabbi Aha
ben Jacob's interpretation of the biblical phrase Harut al ha-Luhot:
"Read not 'harut' (carved) but 'herut' (freedom) on the tablets." One is
not free until he devotes himself to the study of Torah. It is precisely
the obligatory aspect of the mitzvah (commandment) that heightens
the merit (and freedom) of the performer: "one is commanded and he
accepts the authority of the commandments upon himself."
Id.
93. This is not the same as saying that the loss of liberty is de minimis. Cf
Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 714 (1995).
94. Admittedly, this does not entirely dispose of the libertarian worry. As
Richard Epstein has observed, "imposing affirmative legal duties necessarily
increases the total level of coercion, public and private, in society," and this in-
volves a "risk of excessive government power," quite apart from its immediate
effects on individuals. Richard Epstein, Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARv. L.
REV. 1106, 1118 (1992)
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In his book Placing Blame, Michael Moore suggests that
laws which prohibit actions impact on liberty in a different
way than laws which require actions.95 He is right about that:
a law that prohibits action A, still leaves us free to choose be-
tween B, C, and D, etc., whereas a law that requires A effec-
tively means that none of those other actions is available to
me during the time I am supposed to be A-ing. I doubt
though whether this can be translated (as Moore suggests)
into a broader theorem about quantum of liberty.96 Such cal-
culations are notoriously difficult, particularly when one has
to factor in the breadth of the description under which the ac-
tions are, respectively, required and prohibited, as well as
things like the onerousness of the action required (how much
other choice it crowds out) and the attractiveness of the action
prohibited (how much I have to keep checking my impulse to
perform it). Quite apart from the considerations discussed in
the previous paragraph, one can think of all sorts of cases
where a requirement seems less of an interference with lib-
erty than a prohibition.97
Moore has made the additional, and rather odd, sugges-
tion that whether there is an important liberty-cost in regard
to a legal provision depends on whether the moral duty en-
forced is a mater of "agent-relative" deontology or not.98 The
duty not to kill may be conceived as an agent-relative duty:
this would mean one must not kill, not even to prevent a
greater number of killings on other occasions by others.99 Du-
95. See MOORE, supra note 25, at 278.
96. See id. ("A law that (positively) coerces me to do some action takes away
more of my liberty than does a law that (negatively) coerces me from doing some
action.").
97. A requirement that all newspapers publish a 15-word slogan for the
ruling party seems, intuitively, less offensive to liberty than a prohibition on
criticizing the regime; though even there, a moment's thought reveals the im-
portance of the other factors just mentioned.
98. See MOORE, supra note 25, at 279-81, 755-56. For the notion of agent-
relativity, see DEREK PARFIT, 27 REASONS AND PERSONS (1984) and SAMUEL
SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 24-26 (1982). A moral re-
striction (such as "do not kill") is treated as agent-relative if each agent is to be
concerned as a matter of priority with his own refraining from killing-for ex-
ample, if he may not kill in order to prevent a greater number of prohibited
killings by others. This means, in effect, that each agent is assigned his own
goal-viz, preventing killings done by himself-as opposed to the common goal
of preventing killings generally.
99. See also the account of rights as "side-constraints" in ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-30 (1974).
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ties of this kind have a stringency that, in Moore's view, may
properly override or displace any liberty-based objection to
their legal enforcement. But, says Moore, the moral duty to
rescue is not like that, for, of course, one may refrain from
rescuing X (even when Ys predicament is immediate and X is
easily rescuable) if the opportunity cost would be a failure to
rescue a larger number of people-W, Y, and Z. One may
trade off positive duties against one another, in a way that
one may not trade off agent-relative duties. This shows,
Moore thinks, that the former are less stringent and the issue
of their enforcement is less compelling. Just as a duty to res-
cue X may have to yield to a duty to rescue W, and Y and Z, so
it may also have to yield to a duty to respect liberty. But the
duty not to kill is not vulnerable in this way; it yields to
nothing, and so there is no difficulty with its enforcement.
The argument is ingenious, but unsuccessful. The dis-
tinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral duties may
tell us something about the appropriate structure for certain
defenses (in the event that these duties are legally enforced):
that is, it may tell us something about the conditions of justi-
fication, e.g., that it is easier to justify on grounds of necessity
a breach of the duty to rescue than it is to justify, on similar
grounds, a breach of the duty not to kill. But there is no rea-
son to think it tells us anything about the relation between
duty and liberty-costs. Given that there are such things as
non-agent-relative duties, the actions they require are al-
ready removed from the sphere of liberty, and may be made
available only--at most-for the performance of other duties,
not for the sort of pursuit of self-interest or whim which is
what a presumption of liberty protects.
With this point, we come to the end of my review of the
five main reasons people think we have for hesitating before
embarking on the legal enforcement of a duty imposed by mo-
rality. What we have seen in this review is that none of the
alleged reasons, supposedly telling against legal enforcement,
is particularly cogent. The example of the Good Samaritan
story has helped us to see (1) that a duty to rescue may be
appropriately motivated by law, where other motivation fails;
(2) that a legal duty to rescue need not introduce any unwel-
come or inappropriate determinacy in regard to our imperfect
duty of beneficence; (3) that there is no serious moral dis-
agreement concerning a duty to rescue; (4) that the legal re-
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quirement of an action rather than an omission is no more a
source of difficulty than any other area of affirmative legal
requirement; and (5) that there is little plausibility in liberty-
based objections to a legal duty to rescue once the moral duty
to rescue is acknowledged.
There is one last legal aspect of the David Cash story,
and the law proposed in response to it, that has no counter-
part in the story of the Good Samaritan. In the David Cash
story, we know about Jeremy Strohmeyer and what happened
to him. No thanks to David Cash, Strohmeyer was appre-
hended and charged with murder, kidnapping, and sexual as-
sault: he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment.' ° The Good Samaritan laws proposed as a response to
Cash's callousness would have required him to report Stroh-
meyer's offense to the authorities (whether this would have
saved Sherrice's life or not).'0 ' Nothing of this kind is indi-
cated in the Good Samaritan story. The thieves who attacked
the man whom the Samaritan helped are long gone, and there
is no question of apprehending them.' That is a contingent
feature of the story. But it is also worth noting that a duty to
report is not at all the same thing as a duty to rescue, except
in cases where the report is what makes a rescue (or a re-
sponsible or effective rescue) possible.' As Daniel Yeager
has noted, a duty to report raises issues about misprision of
felony,"0 which may be quite distinct from the immediacy of
100. See Eric Lichtblau & Nora Zamichow, Guilty Plea in Casino Slaying:
Strohmeyer Deal Averts Murder Trial And Chance of Death Sentence, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at Al.
101. See supra notes 5-6; see also Call for Samaritan Law Out of Child-Sex
Case: Penalties for Witnesses Who Don't Report, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1998, at
A2 ("Witnesses who fail to report sexual crimes against children would face
criminal penalties under federal legislation proposed yesterday by a Texas
lawmaker.").
102. See OESTERLEY, supra note 66, at 162 (pointing out that the testimony
of a Samaritan would not have been admissible in a Jewish court).
103. This may be so in the reporting requirements of ordinary child abuse
statutes, where a report is needed to initiate the rescue of a child from an on-
going abusive situation.
104. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Op-
ponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 30-38
(1993); see also Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 427 n.35 (1985). For American case law rejecting
misprision of felony as a common law offense, see Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054,
1069 (Md. 1979).
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harm-prevention involved in the duty to rescue.'
III.
From the point of view of our concern with David Cash et
al., one of the most striking features of the interaction be-
tween Jesus and the lawyer in the Good Samaritan story is
the lack of any particular interest in the content of the com-
mandment to "Love thy neighbor." The focus is all on the is-
sue of scope ("Who are the beneficiaries?"), not content ("What
exactly do I owe to them?"). As I said in Part II, the lawyer
has no hesitation in recognizing that the priest and the Levite
have failed to prove themselves neighborly to the man in
need, even though they never affirmatively harmed him.
Anxious as he was to justify himself,' the expert on the law
did not seize on this aspect of the matter.
So what was the lawyer's concern when he stood up to
put Jesus to the test? He asked what he must do to inherit
eternal life. When Jesus threw his question back at him, the
lawyer produced the conventional summary of the Deca-
logue. 1°7 That might have been the end of the exchange; but
the lawyer did not want to let go. Seeking perhaps to avoid
the appearance of having asked a simple question to which
any fool (even a lawyer) might know the answer, the nomikos
makes the question an issue of definition: "And who is my
neighbour?" °8
Some theologians have condemned this follow-up ques-
tion as sinful or corrupt logic-chopping."' But actually, the
105. "'Do we really want to become a nation of snitches?' asked Jack King,
attorney and spokesman for the National Association of Criminal Defense At-
torneys." Dan Reed, Experts Warn about Impact of Proposed Good Samaritan
Laws, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 6, 1998, at 44A. Clearly this is quite a dif-
ferent question from "Do we really want to become a nation of rescuers?"
106. See Luke 10:29 (King James).
107. See id. 10:27; Deuteronomy 6:5 (King James) ("And thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy
might."); see also Leviticus 19:18 (King James) ("Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear
any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself . .
108. Luke 10:29 (King James). Joel Feinberg is mistaken in his suggestion
that "Jesus ... puzzles the lawyer by framing his most basic moral teaching in
terms of one's 'neighbor."' See FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 133. This is, first
because the "neighbor" formulation is presented initially by the lawyer not Je-
sus; and secondly, the "neighbor" formulation is canonical. See Leviticus 19:18
(King James).
109. See DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 77 (1959).
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definitional question is not at all unreasonable in the context
of Mosaic law. Jesus himself acknowledged this when He told
His disciples, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou
shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy,"' 10 and when
He presented His own teaching in this regard-"But I say
unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do
good to them that hate you""I-as explicitly radical and un-
familiar."2 Mosaic injunctions of mutual aid sometimes do
draw distinctions between neighbors and near neighbors,
brothers you know and brothers you don't know, etc."' Joel
Feinberg has suggested that "[t]he reason why a lawyer might
ask Jesus 'Who is my neighbor?' may be that a neighbor, in
the ordinary narrow sense of the term, is a person with whom
one has a somewhat special moral relationship, if only in
terms of constant proximity and shared interests." 4  Fein-
berg adds: "Special relationships often generate special duties
and reciprocal expectations.""' The lawyer may have wanted
Jesus parries the question as a temptation of the devil .... It is the
sort of question you can keep on asking without ever getting an answer.
Its source lies in the "wrangling of men, corrupted in mind and bereft of
truth"; of men "doting about questionings and disputes of words."
From it "cometh envy, strife, railings, even surmisings" (I Tim. 6.4 f).
It is the question of men who are puffed up, men who are "ever learn-
ing, and never able to come to knowledge of the truth." Of men "holding
a form of godliness, but having denied the power thereof' (I Tim. 3.5
ff). They cannot believe, and they keep on asking this same question
because they are "branded in their own conscience, as with a hot iron"
(I Tim. 4.2).
Id.; see also PAUL RAMSEY, BASIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS 92 (1950) ("It may be sup-
posed that the priest and the Levite were hurrying along that day to a confer-
ence called to give authoritative answer to the question, 'Who is my neighbor?").
110. Matthew 5:43 (King James).
111. Id. 5:44.
112. See id. 5:46-47 ("For if ye love them which love you, what reward have
ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only,
what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans so?").
113. See Deuteronomy 22:1-2 (King James).
Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide
thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy
brother. And if thy brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him
not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with
thee until thy brother seek after it, and thou shalt restore it to him
again.
Id. (emphasis added). Some translations put "fellow-countryman" for brother.
114. FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 132; see supra note 108 (discussing Fein-
berg's mistake in attributing the neighbor formulation to Jesus, as though that
might have taken the lawyer by surprise).
115. FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 132.
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Jesus' "take" on the conditions under which one person be-
comes specially related to another in this way: in the ex-
change, Jesus refused to give any special gloss on the com-
mandments; but maybe He would do so with regard to the
definition of "neighbor." Again, Mosaic law is riddled with
important distinctions between insiders and outsiders,
friends and enemies, those who may be admitted to the peo-
ple of Israel and those who must be shunned.'16 In light of Je-
sus' radical teachings on other matters, the lawyer would
have been interested in whether He wanted a radical recon-
ception of these differences as well.
In this regard, it is highly significant for our story that
one of the most important groups of outsiders in the era of the
Second Temple were Samaritans. Jews regarded Samaritans
with contempt, as half-breeds and apostates. "They were
publicly cursed in the synagogues; and a petition was daily
offered up praying God that the Samaritans might not be par-
takers of eternal life."" 7 As the woman at the well said fa-
mously to Jesus, "How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest
drink of me, which am a woman of Samaria? for the Jews
have no dealings with the Samaritans.""'
The answer, then, that the lawyer receives is quite star-
tling. Instead of a reiteration (or even a reconception) of the
traditional divisions, animosities, and taboos, the lawyer is
given an answer which cuts straight across ethnic and relig-
ious lines. From the standpoint of Jewish law, the Samaritan
was definitely not a neighbor of the Jew he assisted."9 The
story might be compelling enough if it contrasted the helping
116. See Deuteronomy 23:1-4 (King James).
He that is wounded in the stones, or hath his privy member cut off,
shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord. A bastard shall not
enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation
shall he not enter into the congregation of the Lord. An Ammonite or
Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to their
tenth generation shall they not enter into the congregation of the Lord
for ever: [because they met you not with bread and with water in the
way, when ye came forth out of Egypt; and because they hired against
thee Balaam the son of Beor of Pethor of Mesopotamia, to curse thee.
Id.
117. OESTERLEY, supra note 66, at 162.
118. John 4:9 (King James).
119. See JOHN BOWMAN, THE SAMARITAN PROBLEM: STUDIES IN THE
RELATIONSHIPS OF SAMARITANISM, JUDAISM, AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY 69 (Al-
fred M. Johnson trans., 1975).
1090 [Vol. 40
GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM
behavior of a stranger with the neglectful behavior of a
friend, or the neglectful behavior of a professional (the priest
in the story) with that of a layman. But, as Herbert Finga-
rette points out, "Jesus ...substitutes a Samaritan, a geo-
graphical neighbor, but one who was despised and hated by
the Jews of his time as being uncouth, unclean, immoral, and
heretical.' ' ° One might as well tell a story about a Palestin-
ian coming to the aid of an Israeli."'
It is worth pausing to consider the basis of the particular
antipathy between Jews and Samaritans. The division be-
tween Samaria and Israel proper had its origins in the divi-
sion of the people of Israel into southern and northern parts
(Judah and Samaria), recorded in the first book of Kings. 22
The same book records the depravity and idolatry of the kings
of Samaria (though it indicates also that the contemporary
rulers of Judah were not much better). The biblical account
has the northern kingdom succumbing to Assyrian conquest
and deportation a little earlier than the southern kingdom.1
23
The most important upshot of the conquest is recorded in the
second book of Kings: the settlement of foreigners in the con-
quered lands of Samaria and the mixing of Jewish and for-
eign traditions:"'
[Tihe king of Assyria brought men from Babylon, and from
Cuthah, and from Ava, and from Hamath, and from
Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria in-
stead of the children of Israel .... And so it was at the be-
ginning of their dwelling there, that they feared not the
Lord: therefore the Lord sent lions among them, which
slew some of them. Wherefore they spake to the king of
Assyria, saying, The nations which thou hast... placed in
the cities of Samaria, know not the manner of the God of
the land: therefore he hath sent lions among them....
Then the king of Assyria commanded, saying, Carry
thither one of the priests whom ye brought from thence;
120. Herbert Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 217-18.
121. See Winch, supra note 32, at 156.
122. See 1 Kings 16:21-33 (King James); see also 9 FLAvIUS JOSEPHUS,
ANTIQUITIES OF THE JEWS.
123. See Isaiah 10:10-11 (King James) ("As my hand hath found the king-
doms of the idols, and whose graven images did excel them of Jerusalem and of
Samaria; [s]hall I not, as I have done unto Samaria and her idols, so do to Jeru-
salem and her idols?"); see also Ezekiel 16:51-52 (King James).
124. See 2 Kings 17:18-33 (King James).
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and let them go and dwell there, and let him teach them
the manner of the God of the land. Then one of the priests
whom they had carried away from Samaria came and
dwelt in Bethel, and taught them how they should fear the
Lord. Howbeit every nation made gods of their own, and
put them in the houses of the high places which the Sa-
maritans had made.... So they feared the LORD ...
[but] served their own gods, after the manner of the na-
tions whom they carried away from thence.' 5
On some accounts the bulk of the deported Northerners never
returned.' However, a number of them may have returned
by Assyrian order, and of course we should bear in mind that
many were never deported, but coexisted and interbred with
the Assyrian colonists.
By contrast to all this, when the Jews of Judah and Jeru-
salem were exiled, following the invasion by the Babyloni-
ans under Nebuchadnezzar, they remained a homogenous
group. No foreign settlers were brought in to occupy their
land, and they were allowed to return to Jerusalem and
rebuild their temple within seventy years. From then on,
the Jerusalem community remained as a self-contained
entity, avoiding contact with their paganized neighbours
as far as possible.
127
The Jerusalem attitude to those living in Samaria is summed
up in what must be regarded as a sermon or propaganda on
the issue in 2 Kings 17:
Unto this day they do after the former manners: they fear
not the LORD, neither do they after their statutes, or after
their ordinances, or after the law and commandment
which the LORD commanded the children of Jacob, whom
he named Israel; . . . Howbeit they did not hearken, but
they did after their former manner. So these nations
feared the LORD, and served their graven images, both
125. 2 id. 17:24-29, 32-33 (King James).
126. See R.J. COGGINS, SAMARITANS AND JEWS: THE ORIGINS OF
SAMARITANISM RECONSIDERED (1975). Coggins summarizes the traditional
view as follows:
After the Assyrian conquest of the Northern Kingdom of Israel, the in-
habitants of the land were deported never to return (the "ten lost
tribes"). In their stead, the land was repopulated by groups brought
from other parts of the Assyrian Empire-groups whose race was as
mixed as their religion, which was a syncretistic blend of their own lo-
cal cults and a debased version of Yahwehism.
Id.
127. Id.; see also Ezra 9:1-11 (King James).
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their children, and their children's children: as did their
fathers, so do they unto this day.
121
Subsequent biblical material prophesied a reintegration
of the people of Samaria into the greater Jewish commu-
nity, 12 but the issue remained a problem, up to and beyond
New Testament times. Matthew's gospel appears to take the
conventional (Jerusalem) view, for it has Jesus directing His
disciples: "Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any
city of the Samaritans enter ye not."3 ' But John Bowman has
argued that the Gospels of John and Luke (the source of our
first story) were directed explicitly to the Samaritan prob-
lem.' In those texts, the problem is grappled with in a much
more conciliatory way, and Jesus is said variously to have re-
fused to lash out at a Samaritan refusal of hospitality,'32 to
have conversed with and accepted refreshment from a Sa-
128. 2 Kings 17:34, 40-1 (King James). The online ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA provides the following entry for "samaritan":
[Miember of a community of Jews, now nearly extinct, that claims to be
related by blood to those Jews of ancient Samaria who were not de-
ported by the Assyrian conquerors of the kingdom of Israel in 722 BC.
The Samaritans call themselves Bene-Yisrael ("Children of Israel"), or
Shamerim ("Observant Ones"), for their sole norm of religious obser-
vance is the Pentateuch (first five books of the Old Testament). Other
Jews call them simply Shomronim (Samaritans); in the Talmud (rab-
binical compendium of law, lore, and commentary), they are called Ku-
tim, suggesting that they are rather descendants of Mesopotamian
Cuthaeans, who settled in Samaria after the Assyrian conquest. Jews
who returned to their homeland after the Babylonian Exile would not
accept the help of the dwellers of the land, who were later identified as
the Samaritans, in the building of the Second Temple of Jerusalem.
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.eb.com>.
129. See, e.g., Jeremiah 31:5-6 (King James).
130. Matthew 10:5 (King James).
131. See BOWMAN, supra note 119. See also the apostolic concern for the
conversion of the Samaritans to Christianity in Acts 1:8 and 8:14-15 (written,
as we think, by the author of Luke).
132. See Luke 9:51-56 (King James).
And it came to pass, when the time was come that he should be re-
ceived up, he steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem, [aind sent
messengers before his face: and they went, and entered into a village of
the Samaritans, to make ready for him. And they did not receive him,
because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem. And when
his disciples James and John saw this, they said, Lord, wilt thou that
we command fire to come down from heaven, and consume them, even
as Elias did? But he turned, and rebuked them, and said, Ye know not
what manner of spirit ye are of. For the Son of man is not come to de-
stroy men's lives, but to save them. And they went to another village.
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maritan woman,' to have cured a group of lepers of whom
only one-a Samaritan-expressed gratitude, and to have
remained silent in face of a Jewish accusation that He Him-
self was a Samaritan."5 In this context, the story of the Good
Samaritan can only be understood as an attempt to widen the
scope of "neighbor," to heal the breach in Israel, and poten-
tially to embrace the whole of mankind.3 '
133. See John 4:5-10 (King James).
Then cometh he to a city of Samaria, which is called Sychar, near to the
parcel of ground that Jacob gave to his son Joseph. Now Jacob's well
was there. Jesus therefore, being wearied with his journey, sat thus on
the well: and it was about the sixth hour. There cometh a woman of
Samaria to draw water: Jesus saith unto her, Give me to drink. (For
his disciples were gone away unto the city to buy meat.) Then saith the
woman of Samaria unto him, How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest
drink of me, which am a woman of Samaria? for the Jews have no
dealings with the Samaritans. Jesus answered and said unto her, If
thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me
to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given
thee living water.
Id.
134. See Luke 17:11-18 (King James).
And it came to pass, as he went to Jerusalem, that he passed through
the midst of Samaria and Galilee. And as he entered into a certain
village, there met him ten men that were lepers, which stood afar off:
And they lifted up their voices, and said, Jesus, Master, have mercy on
us. And when he saw them, he said unto them, Go shew yourselves
unto the priests. And it came to pass, that, as they went, they were
cleansed. And one of them, when he saw that he was healed, turned
back, and with a loud voice glorified God, [aind fell down on his face at
his feet, giving him thanks: and he was a Samaritan. And Jesus an-
swering said, Were there not ten cleansed? but where are the nine?
There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this
stranger.
Id. It is possible that the Samaritan leper returned to show himself to Je-
sus as his "priest."
135. See John 8:42-50 (King James).
Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love me: for I
proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he
sent me. Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye can-
not hear my word.... He that is of God heareth God's words: ye there-
fore hear them not, because ye are not of God. Then answered the
Jews, and said unto him, Say we not well that thou art a Samaritan,
and hast a devil? Jesus answered, I have not a devil; but I honour my
Father, and ye do dishonour me. And I seek not mine own glory: there
is one that seeketh and judgeth.
Id.
136. Consider also the way in which Jesus is presented as open to persuasion
to extend his healing ministry beyond Israel in Mark 7:24-30 (King James).
And from thence he arose, and went into the borders of Tyre and Sidon,
and entered into an house, and would have no man know it: but he
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Construed along these lines, the parable of the Good Sa-
maritan might seem quite irrelevant to the case of David
Cash. It might be viewed as an attempt to cross parochial
boundaries, and widen our sense of duty to include all man-
kind-a kind of lesson in cosmopolitan concern, of the sort
found, for example, in Martha Nussbaum's recent work.'87
Against those who would confine the basis of moral concern
within the boundaries of one's own community, Professor
Nussbaum quotes the Stoics:
When Diogenes the Cynic replied, "I am a citizen of the
world," he meant ... that he refused to be defined by his
local origins and group membership.... The Stoics, who
followed his lead, further developed his image of the kos-
mou polites (world citizen) arguing that each of us dwells,
in effect, in two communities-the local community of our
birth, and the community of human argument and aspira-
tion that is "truly great and truly common, in which we
look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the
boundaries of our nation by the sun." It is this community
that is, fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations.
With respect to the most basic moral values, such as jus-
tice, "We should regard all human beings as our fellow
citizens and neighbors."38
Well, similarly, by saying that the lawyer should go off and do
as the Samaritan did-that he too should be prepared to cross
communal boundaries to render aid to others qua human-
Jesus may be viewed preaching a form of universalism that is
no doubt very important,139 but not really at issue in regard to
could not be hid. For a certain woman, whose young daughter had an
unclean spirit, heard of him, and came and fell at his feet: The woman
was a Greek, a Syrophenician by nation; and she besought him that he
would cast forth the devil out of her daughter. But Jesus said unto her,
Let the children first be filled: for it is not meet to take the children's
bread, and to cast it unto the dogs. And she answered and said unto
him, Yes, Lord: yet the dogs under the table eat of the children's
crumbs. And he said unto her, For this saying go thy way; the devil is
gone out of thy daughter. And when she was come to her house, she
found the devil gone out, and her daughter laid upon the bed.
Id.
137. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE
LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM (1996).
138. Id. at 6-7 (citations ommitted).
139. See Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alterna-
tive, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992) (showing my own estimate of the im-
portance of universities).
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duties to rescue. 14 It is more about Mdecins sans Frontitres,
140. For modern Samaritans' views on ethnic boundaries, consider the rather
sad article, James Meek, Even for the Samaritans Giving Is Getting Harder:
Ethnic Survival Is the Priority for the Bible's Model People, GUARDIAN (London),
Dec. 31, 1999, at 15:
It wasn't that the Samaritans weren't good any more, explained
Husney Cohen. It was just that these days they were so much in need
of help themselves that there wasn't a lot left over for anyone else. Mr
Cohen, one of the world's last surviving ethnic Samaritans, was trying
to get across why, nigh-on two millennia after Jesus's parable made his
people a byword for goodness in the Christian world, Samaritan philan-
thropy was on hold. "The only thing we have left is the land the village
is built on here, and in five years' time we're going to need more."
The present-day Samaritans cherish their benign reputation, but it
hasn't made them outward-looking. In their two tiny communities-
the village of Kiryat Luza, 720 metres (2,400ft) up on their holy Mount
Gerizim near Nablus in the northern part of the West Bank, and a
housing estate in Holon near Tel Aviv-the hereditary priests of the
Cohen family keep scrupulous guard on Samaritan mores, ensuring
that only a trickle of non-Samaritan genes enters the 600-strong na-
tion.
Mr Cohen, a priest on Mount Gerizim and curator of the Samari-
tans" one-room museum, likes to put the mere 2,000 years of Christi-
anity in perspective. The Samaritans believe they, not the Jews, are
the true inheritors of the covenant between God and Moses's Israelites.
On a genealogical ready reckoner Mr Cohen showed who was the Sa-
maritans" high priest in the time of Jesus: "Jonathan," he said, as if
talking about a favourite uncle.
The Samaritan name also opens doors. A Samaritan emissary
called at the foreign office in London and the US state department in
Washington this month, seeking support for guaranteed freedom of
passage between Mount Gerizim in Palestinian territory and Holon in
Israel.
Mr Cohen stressed that the Samaritans only followed their own,
slightly different Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament, but:
"It's written in the New Testament that we were good people, trying to
help others. That makes us feel that we exist." Asked whether the
Samaritans were aware of Margaret Thatcher's infamous 1980 attempt
to reinterpret the Good Samaritan story, when she said the point was
that the Samaritan had been wealthy enough to be charitable in the
first place, Mr Cohen said no, but endorsed the sentiment. "Of course,"
he said, "You have to be able to earn something to be able to give to
others. Even God says you have to give a tenth of what you get to help
others, but you have to have something in order to be able to give."
The bad news for Thatcher-ites is that not only are there no Sa-
maritan philanthropists on Mount Gerizim: there are no entrepre-
neurs, either. The Samaritans have all found state-funded work in the
emerging bureaucracy of the Palestinian Authority. The Samaritan
communities have undergone something of a renaissance in the past 50
years. In 1917, only 146 were left alive. Since then numbers have
quadrupled. This resurgence is all the more remarkable given the se-
verity of the marriage rules laid down by the Cohens, one of five ex-
tended Samaritan families. Females may not marry a non-Samaritan.
2000] GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM 1097
than about David Cash and Sherrice Iverson.
That is a possible response. But it is not the only one.
We might approach the matter instead by emphasizing the
focused altruism of Jesus' Good Samaritan rather than a
more diffuse and universal human concern. If we emphasize
the concrete focus of the Samaritan's altruism, we may find
that we can hold on to an illuminating version of the "special
relationship" idea. Instead of saying that Jesus' parable es-
tablishes an all-purpose neighborhood as between any two
members of the human race, we focus instead on the special-
ness of the Samaritan's proximity to the man who fell among
thieves. Several times in Part II of this essay I drew atten-
Males may, but only if they can persuade a non-Samaritan women to
convert to their religion, similar in many ways to ultra-Orthodox Ju-
daism. Diseases connected with inbreeding are a constant fear. One
researcher found that more than four-fifths of marriages took place be-
tween first and second cousins; deafness and a paraplegic disability
were higher than average. And for unknown reasons, the Samaritans
give birth to many more boys than girls.
In its eyrie on the mountain, with neat modern bungalows and
magnificent views, the village of Kiryat Luza is pretty. But its single
street is the scene of nightly heartache as scores of young men woo the
same 20-odd women they have known since they went to kindergarten
together. Yet the Samaritans say that to their knowledge no one has
ever left the community. Hind Samri, a 23-year-old Samaritan woman
who is engaged, said: "I never thought about it. It's the way we were
brought up. I've got friends from other religions but I'd never think of
marrying someone from a different religion." One of the Samaritan
bachelors, Sami Samri, 24, said: "There's never been a single case of
somebody going outside the community to get married. But some of us
have managed to convince Jewish girls to become Samaritans."
With the shortage of eligible partners, regular meetings between
the Holon Samaritans and the mountain Samaritans are vital. But the
communities are growing apart. The Samaritans of Holon speak He-
brew at home, serve in the Israeli army and have begun to fall subtly
under the spell of modern life. The Samaritans of the mountain use
Arabic and have thrown in their lot with the nascent Palestine. "We
have eastern customs and they have western customs. That doesn't
mean they don't protect their religion. They do," said Sami Samri.
"They have some western mentalities which don't contradict their re-
ligion. Like boy and girl go out, they stay out till late at night. Girls
wear short skirts. It's true, we do feel it. We used to be closer."
Benyamim Tsedaka, editor of AB, the first and so far only Samari-
tan newspaper and a Holon resident, acknowledged that today what
concerned him was not being a good Samaritan but being good at being
a Samaritan. We're not a group of angels, thinking how to help people
all the time, but we care for ourselves and our existence," he said. "I
want to leave this world with a feeling that I did the best for my com-
munity."
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tion to the particular compelling immediacy that the Samari-
tan responded to in the situation. 141 And this I think is the
key to the matter. In pursuit of this line of argument, I shall
argue that the important work in the story is done not by any
general cosmopolitan universalism, but by the sheer particu-
larity of the accidental conjunction in time and space of two
concrete individuals. And I shall argue, too, that this is the
lesson we should draw from the parable so far as our response
to the sorry tale of David Cash is concerned.
I admit that at first sight this strategy seems unpromis-
ing. The denouement of the parable may certainly be read
perhaps as an explosion of special-relationship approach to
the definition of "neighbor." It may be read as indicating that
we should stop thinking about the specialness of certain hu-
man relations (as opposed to others) and focus instead on the
mere fact of someone's humanity. But the mere fact of some-
one's humanity can be emphasized in two ways. It is evident
that the Samaritan's benevolence was not like that of Charles
Dickens's character Mrs. Jellyby, who was so "devoted to the
subject of Africa; with a view to the general cultivation of the
coffee berry--and the natives-and the happy settlement, on
the banks of the African rivers, of our superabundant home
population" 14' that she took no notice of the hungry and dirty
children at her feet (tumbling downstairs and into the fire-
place). Though Mrs. Jellyby was a pleasant enough woman,
Dickens's narrator in Bleak House observes that her "hand-
some eyes . . . had a curious habit of seeming to look a long
way off. As if . . . they could see nothing nearer than Af-
rica!"'43 The Good Samaritan was not a humanitarian in that
sense; he was not a "telescopic philanthropist."'44 Also, unlike
his modern namesakes-I mean the Samaritans' Organiza-
tion (an entirely worthy group that maintains a counseling
service available by telephone to those who are depressed,
lonely, or suicidal)' 45-there is no reason to think that the
Samaritan in Jesus' parable was on the look-out for an oppor-
141. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34, 53-57.
142. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 36 (Fields, Osgood & Co. 1869).
143. Id. at 39.
144. Id. "Telescopic Philanthropy" is Dickens's title for Chapter IV of BLEAK
HOUSE, from which I have just been quoting.
145. See MONICA DICKENS, BEFRIENDING: THE AMERICAN SAMARITANS




tunity to rescue people who fell among thieves or other vic-
tims of disaster. He was simply on the road, and he came
upon the scene of the robbery "as he journeyed."'46 When he
came near the man, he apprehended roughly what had hap-
pened, and straight away gave aid to him as a neighbor. He
would have surmised quickly enough that the injured man
was probably a Jew rather than a fellow Samaritan. Appar-
ently that did not present itself as an obstacle,'47 for he re-
sponded immediately to the injured man's presence and his
plight. Paul Ramsey's commentary is helpful:
Never is it said [in the story] that "neighbor" includes "en-
emy" among those who ought to be loved because they are
human beings, but rather that love for another for his own
sake, neighborly love in the Christian sense, discovers the
neighbor in every man it meets .... Christian love does
not mean discovering the essentially human underneath
differences: it means detecting the neighbor underneath
friendliness or hostility or any other qualities in which the
agent takes special interest. The full particularity of
neighborly love ... should not be reduced to universal
brotherhood or the cosmopolitan spirit.
4
Ramsey is no doubt exaggerating when he goes on to say that
the Samaritan's good deed "stands at an opposite pole from
love for mankind generally, 1 49 but it puts the emphasis
healthily on the compelling nature of the particular and the
present, so far as rescue is concerned. From this point of
view, the cosmopolitan strand of the story highlights nothing
much more than the arbitrary "thrownness"1" of our being in
the presence of another. There is no telling who you will run
into-who you will find yourself in the immediate neighbor-
hood of-when you are on the road. That you find yourself
side-by-side with an X rather than a Y may be discomfiting-
even a source of anxiety and tension"'-but there it is: this is
146. Luke 10:33 (King James) (emphasis added).
147. But cf. Winch, supra note 32, at 156 (pointing out that it was "just the
sort of situation in which one might expect questions and hesitations").
148. RAMSEY, supra note 109, at 94. I am grateful to Philip Selznick, years
ago, for drawing my attention to this passage.
149. Id. at 95.
150. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 127 (Joan Stambaugh trans.,
1996). This is a translation from the term "Gerworfen[heitl." Id. at 472 (altera-
tion in original).
151. See id. at 163-64.
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who, in particular, you have to deal with. '52
Now, just like the Samaritan, David Cash was on the
road, driving from casino to casino, and thus in a situation
where there was no telling who he would find himself along-
side. Consider some more details in the story. We are told
that "[i]t was supposed to be a brief stop at the Primadonna
casino, [forty-three] miles south of Las Vegas, but one poker
game led to another. By 3 a.m. May 25, 1997, Jeremy Stroh-
meyer and David Cash were tired of hanging around the ar-
cade, waiting for David's dad.' '153 Striking up conversations
with those around them, they began kidding around with a
seven-year-old girl, Sherrice Iverson, who was also waiting
for her father to finish gambling. Like them she came from
Los Angeles, but their backgrounds were utterly different.
They were white and affluent; she was a black girl from a
broken home. Sherrice's father, Leroy, who had recently split
up with her mother,
didn't trust baby-sitters. So when he went gambling just
across the Nevada border, he always took Sherrice and
[Sherrice's brother] Harold. It had become a family ritual.
On this Memorial Day weekend, they scrambled into his
'91 white Dodge van and left Los Angeles at 8 p.m. to
avoid traffic. Wearing a white "Jesus Loves Me" T-shirt,
Leroy pulled into the Primadonna parking lot around
midnight. Leroy told Harold he was in charge of Sherrice
and gave each $5 to play arcade games. Leroy then
headed for the slot machines. 154
Sherrice played with her brother, and was occasionally taken
back to her father by security guards. The father sent her
away. She began playing hide-and-seek with Jeremy Stroh-
152. See Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in
CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 173-74 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman
eds., 2000). There, discussing the idea of civic cooperation, I said:
Civic responsibility-this business of coming to terms responsibly with
others-is relative to what is more or less a geographical relation of
being unavoidably side by side with others. In the circumstances of
modern life, that geographical relation-being unavoidably side by side
with others-is no guarantee whatever that common moral views and
shared understandings can be taken for granted. We are not in a posi-
tion to pick and choose those with whom we are required to come to
terms.
Id. at 173.




meyer, as Strohmeyer's friend David Cash looked on:
For the next 11 minutes, they dodged around the arcade,
loping up one aisle and down the next, amid the din of
galactic wars, race cars and battling superheroes. A tall
blond teenager from a wealthy Long Beach family playing
tag with a small black girl from South-Central, whose dad
was on disability. She weighed 46 pounds and stood just
under 4 feet. He was nearly 2 feet taller and outweighed
her by 100 pounds. Sherrice darted into the ladies
restroom at 3:47 a.m .... Jeremy went to the water foun-
tain. He swallowed, inhaled deeply on his Marlboro and
followed the little girl into the restroom .... Curious, his
friend David followed. 155
And so, there they were, in the restroom, thrown to-
gether-Sherrice with Strohmeyer, and Strohmeyer's friend
Cash there too, watching from the next stall. After half-
heartedly trying to get his friend to stop attacking the little
girl,"6 Cash "walked out of the restroom and left the ar-
cade.... He sat on a concrete bench in the courtyard. He
had been in the restroom two minutes." 7 A little more than
twenty minutes later. Strohmeyer emerged. When Cash
caught sight of him, "he said: 'Dude, let's go. My dad is
waiting for us.""'8 And soon they were on the road again.
The boys piled into David's father's 1988 blue Chevy and
drove north to Las Vegas. As soon as they reached the
city, about 7 a.m. Sunday, David Cash Sr. went gambling.
The teens slept in the car until noon.
That day and the next, they played nickel and quarter
slot machines. David won $22.50. They drank beer. They
rode the roller coaster at the New York, New York casino.
They cruised the Luxor and MGM Grand.' 59
The emptiness of these lives and the transience and sad
haphazardness of the encounter are not at issue here. This is
what it is like to be "on the road," in the anonymity of a gam-
bling town, in the late twentieth century. What is of more
pressing moral concern is David Cash's failure to see that the
fact of this anonymous encounter with Sherrice Iverson made





159. Zamichow, supra note 78, at Al.
110120001
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ception (reported in an L.A. Times interview) was that he had
no connection to Iverson:
Were you appalled that a friend said he killed a little girl?
Cash: "I'm not going to get upset over somebody else's life.
I just worry about myself first. I'm not going to lose sleep
over somebody else's problems.". . . What about when you
think of Sherrice? Cash: "I don't think of it. I don't know
her." Do you feel bad for her? Cash: "The situation sucks
in general." Do you feel worse for her or for Jeremy?
Cash: "Because I knew Jeremy, I feel worse for him. I
know he had a lot going for him."6 °
The moral of the story of David Cash is that that sort of
clinging to the notion of who I know and who I don't know
simply will not do, in the circumstances of modern life. It
wouldn't do on the road to Jericho in biblical times, and it
won't do either in the casinos that line the highways of mod-
ern Nevada. There we are constantly in the presence of peo-
ple we don't know, and we have an array of compelling duties
in their regard-some affirmative, some negative; some legal,
some merely moral-duties whose stringency bears no corre-
spondence whatever to the degree of our connection to the
other people involved or the extent of our antecedent concern.
Issues like these may or may not usefully be conceived in
terms of "special relationships." Though there was no antece-
dent special relationship between David Cash and Sherrice
Iverson that might ground a traditional duty to rescue, that
doesn't mean that their relation was wholly abstract-the
relation of one instance of common humanity or of one
anonymous citizen of the world to another. Their relationship
at that time and in that place was morally significant in its
particularity, and it was special by virtue of the immediate
concrete circumstances of their encounter. Cash was close
enough to touch the little girl, in circumstances in which she
desperately needed someone's help and he was the only one at
hand. True, he would have had to make a significant effort to
intervene successfully, but as we have seen, his placement in
the situation was already such that he also had to make a
special effort to break the connection with Sherrice Iverson's
predicament and walk away. Also, there were surely hun-




they had come into that restroom-might also have had the
opportunity to save her. And then they too would have had
this special relationship; or, in the case of people like the se-
curity guards, their existing special relationship to vulnerable
youngsters in the casino would have taken on an additional
layer of immediacy. The difference is that David Cash was
there, on the spot, actually not hypothetically. The structure
of the situation has singled him out. None of us has any
doubt that all this placed David Cash in particular in a very
different moral situation from those whose connection to the
assault was more distant or hypothetical. Since this is so, it
is difficult to see what objection there could be in principle to
law's intervention to bolster this compelling moral duty. Cer-
tainly such objection can not be based on general apprehen-
sions about the law requiring abstract benevolence, because it
is the particularity of this situation, not its abstraction, that
has led to the call for Good Samaritan laws.
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